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ESSAYS

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
FIVE AUTHORS IN SEARCH OF A THEORY
DanielJ Meltzer*
The Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence has repeatedly
been characterized as under-theorized.' The three sovereign immu2
nity decisions handed down on the Term's last day-Alden v. Maine,
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board,3 and FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducationExpense Board v. College Savings Bank4---provide still more support for that view. Together
with decisions of the past few years- United States v. Lopez,5 City of
* Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. My thoughts on this topic have
been shaped in numerous conversations with my colleagues Dick Fallon and David
Shapiro. I have also drawn on material included in RicHARD H. FALLON,JR., DANIELJ.
MEL=ZER, & DAVID L. SHAPmo, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SySTEM (4th ed. Supp. 1999) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER'S 1999
SuPPLEmENT], of which Professor Shapiro was the primary author. I am grateful, in
addition, to both Professors Fallon and Shapiro, and to Charles Fried, Andy Kaufinan,
Bernard Meltzer, Larry Tribe, and Ann Woolhandler, for reading and providing very
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Joshua Berman provided invaluable research
assistance.
1 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, andYeskey, 1998 Sul,. CT. REV. 71; Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy:May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement FederalLaw?,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Roderick M. Hills,Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 813 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2180 (1998); Martin H. Redish, Constitutionalizing
Federalism:A FoundationalAnalysis, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1237, 1247-48 (1997); Mark
Tushnet, Keeping Your Eye on the Ball The Significance of the Revival of Constitutional
Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 1065 (1997).
2 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
3 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999).
4 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999).
5 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Boerne v. Ilores,6 Seminole Tribe v. Florida,7 and Printz v. United States 8they do make clear, however, that the majority's commitment to imposing constitutional limits on national legislative authority is farreaching. 9
In this Essay, I offer some observations about the implications of
last Term's decisions for the enforcement of federal law and about the
relationship of those decisions more broadly to judicial enforcement
of constitutional limits on federal power. What is most striking about
last Term's decisions, in my view, is their effort to enforce a vision of
constitutional federalism not by restricting the reach of congressional
authority to regulate the states, but rather by limiting the remedial
means by which Congress may enforce regulation of the states that is
otherwise within its substantive legislative power. In ways that the
Court fails to acknowledge, its effort falls to promote any coherent
conception of states' rights or state autonomy while haning legitimate national objectives.
I.

IMMUNITY AND THE Lrmrrs OF NATIONAL AUTHORIT

The limits on national legislative authority imposed by the
Court's recent decisions fall into two sets. First are subject matters
that are deemed to fall beyond national legislative power altogether.
The leading cases here are Lopez, holding that a federal statute
prohibiting the possession of firearms near schools fell outside of the
Commerce Power, and City of Boerne, holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199310 (RFRA), as applied to state and local
governments, was outside of congressional authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, even when Congress is legislating as to matters generally
within its constitutional authority, some legislative techniques are
deemed to be constitutionally impermissible because they are not
6 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
7 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
8 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
9 Three years ago, after noting the hazards of prediction, I suggested that there
is reason to believe that "the decision in Seminole [Tribe] is not one of a mounting
series of blows to the reach of national power, but rather a gesture in the direction of
a diffuse conception of state sovereignty that in the end will not be generally enforced
by the Court." Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,
1996 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 65. Subsequent events have confirmed my view that such predictions are hazardous.
10 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to
bb-4 (1994)).
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"Necessary and Proper"" or otherwise invade an area of state autonomy. Before this Term, one could have summarized these limits as
follows:
2
(1) Anti-Commandeering. Congress may not unconditionally
commandeer state or local legislative or executive officialsI3 to carry
out federally-imposed duties-except possibly when Congress legislates under the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction
4
amendments.'
(2) Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Absent state consent, a federal
court may not, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, entertain a
claim in a private suit (i.e., one brought by a plaintiff other than a
state or the United States) that (a) names a state as a defendant, or
(b) even if nominally against a state official, can be viewed as seeking
certain forms of relief (notably damages against the state fisc) that are
deemed to be "retrospective" 5 -except when Congress is exercising
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2256 (1999).
When a "La[w] ...for carrying into Execution" the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional
provisions... it is not a "La[w] ...proper for carrying into Execution the
Commerce Clause," and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, "merely [an]
ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserve[s] to be treated as such."
Id. (quoting Pfrintz, 521 U.S. at 923-24 (quoting TiE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton))) (omissions and alterations in Printz).
12 The dissenters in Printz asserted, without response from the majority, that the
Court's decision did not rule out "commandeering" as a condition of federal spending or federal non-preemption of state law. Printz, 521 U.S. at 958-62 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Whether that reading is correct remains to be seen. See infra notes
210-11.
13 Pfrintz reaffirmed a distinction between statejudicial officers (who may in some
circumstances be required to implement federal law) and other state officers (who
may not be) that the Court first elaborated in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
178-79 (1992). See Pfintz, 521 U.S. at 927-29 & n.14.
14 As to whether statutes enacted under the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction amendments stand on a different footing, see PennsylvaniaDepartment of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998), Adler & Kreimer, supra note 1, at
119-33, Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
Sup.CT. REV. 199, 236-42, and see also Kathryn Abrams, No "There" There: State Autonomy and Voting Rights Regulation, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 835 (1994) (noting how frequently federal voting rights legislation requires states to enact changes in their
internal political structures).
15 For a discussion of the haziness of the distinction between "retrospective" and
"prospective" relief, of the failure of the Court's decisions to track common understandings of those terms, and the possibility that some Justices have abandoned the
distinction in recent opinions, see Carlos Manuel VSizquez, Night and Day: Coeur
d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-RetrospectiveDistinctionin Eleventh
11
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(with an adequately clear statement) its enforcement powers under
6
the Reconstruction amendments.'
Allied to these two autonomy-based limits is a rule of statutory
construction, though one with constitutional foundations, providing
that federal legislation will not be interpreted to intrude on a sphere
of state political autonomy, absent a clear statement by Congress.
That sphere has been variously described as "areas traditionally regulated by the States,"' 7 "decisions that 'go to the heart of representative
government,"'" 8 and "state governmental functions."19 Some opinions hint that at least certain state functions may be immune not
merely from "commandeering" but more broadly from federal regulation, even when Congress has included an adequately clear
20
statement.
So things stood when the Court handed down its immunity decisions last Term, which sharpened both kinds of limits on national
power. One, the Florida Prepaiddecision, narrows the reach of congressional enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment by invalidating a legislative effort to permit patent holders to enforce their property rights against states engaged in infringement.2 '

The other two broaden

the scope of state sovereign

immunity: College Savings Bank expanded the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment in federal court, 22 and Alden v. Maine extended to states
an immunity from state court suit generally equivalent to the immunity in federal court conferred by the Supreme Court's interpretation
Amendment Doctrine,87 GEO. LJ. 1 (1998), and see also David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 149.

16 On whether Congress has the same power to abrogate under the Enforcement
Clause of the 13th Amendment as it possesses under those of the 14th and 15th
Amendments, see Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110
HARV. L. REV. 102, 107 n.33 (1996).
17 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
18 Id. at 461 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
19 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 469.
20 See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (stating that adoption of the plain statement
rule "may avoid a potential constitutional problem"); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559
(1911)) ("These cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits
the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under
the Commerce Clause.").
21 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119
S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
22 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119
S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
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of the Eleventh Amendment. 23 Collectively, the three decisions
sharply limit federal power to enforce federal obligations validly imposed on state governments through the remedy of private suits for
damages.
II.

IMMNnd Y AND T=E

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAW

The roots of the broadest of the three decisions, Alden v. Maine,
lie in the Court's decision three years earlier, in Seminole Tribe, that
Congress lacks power when legislating under Article I to provide for
full enforcement in federal court of a state's federal duties. In particular, the Seminole Tribe Court held that Congress's powers under Article I do not include the authorization of private suits that name states
as defendants or that seek "retrospective" relief from state officials.
The questions whether Seminole Tribe was correctly decided,
whether it was a necessary implication of Hans v. Louisiana,24 and
whether Hans itself was correctly decided have been much discussed. 25 However one answers those questions, once Seminole Tribe
was decided as it was, the issue whether state courts were required to
hear the very suits that Seminole Tribe excluded from federal jurisdiction assumed great importance. Commenting on Seminole Tribe, I suggested that "a freedom from unconsented federal court suit by private
individuals seeking retrospective relief-and then only if the statute
cannot be viewed as enforcing one of the Reconstruction amendments [-]

... is a curious and unstable place for the last stand of state

sovereignty."2 6 Alden, in extending to the state courts a state's immunity from unconsented private suit (here suit by state employees to
obtain overtime wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)), proves that Seminolewas not in fact the last stand. But if after
Alden the scope of constitutional protection of state autonomy has
shifted, the current resting place remains curious and perhaps unstable as well.
An evaluation of Alden must start with the majority's acknowledgment that Congress has constitutional authority to regulate the labor
standards of state and local employees. That was the holding, after all,
of the 5-4 decision in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthor23
ences
Reich
24
25
26

See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). For a discussion of possible differbetween federal court and state court immunity, see infra note 95 (discussing
v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994)).
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
My own views are set forth in Meltzer, supra note 9.
Id. at 62.
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in 1985. Although one shouldn't bet the farm against Garcia's
being overruled, 28 it remains the law for now. Moreover, Alden, while
failing even to cite Garcia,re-affirmed that the statutory elaboration of
federal labor standards for the states was not to be merely precatory;
the Alden majority mentions three mechanisms by which those duties
might constitutionally be enforced: suit by the United States, private
suit against state officers to enjoin ongoing violations, and private suit
against state officers seeking damages from them in their personal
capacity.
The question Alden presented is whether an additional and familiar remedial technique-a damage action by injured parties against
the organization responsible for the injury-is constitutionally impermissible when the organization is a state government. The importance of that technique to enforcement of federal law surely is
relevant to (though not necessarily determinative of) that question.
The significance of organizational liability for damages may be
highlighted by showing the major shortcomings in each of the permissible alternatives noted by the majority. Begin with private suits for
prospective injunctions. Quite apart from the need to amend the
FLSA to authorize employees to seek prospective relief,29 many violations do not arise from ongoing practices subject to injunctive orders,
while in other cases (Alden included") the employer may come into
compliance so as to make injunctive relief inappropriate. In those
cases, a rule that only injunctions may be obtained is tantamount to a
rule that no relief is available. Even where ongoing practices exist,
merely enjoining their continuation fails to compensate for harm suffered, and may not by itself provide adequate incentives for reasonably complete and prompt compliance. On the latter point, state
27 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
28 For the view that Garciahas already been effectively overruled, seeJohn C. Yoo,
TheJudicialSafeguards of Federalism,70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1334 (1997). One month
after granting certiorari in Alden, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998), the Supreme Court denied a
petition for certiorari that, in seeking review of a federal court action under the FLSA
brought by private individuals against a local government, presented the question

whether Garciashould be overruled. See West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752,
760-61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 607 (1998).
29 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 211 (a), 216(b), 217 (1994) (granting to the Secretary of Labor
authority to seek, inter alia, prospective relief against employers but granting employees authority to seek only back wages and liquidated damages); see also Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 750 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1984); Keenan V.Allan, 889 F.
Supp. 1320, 1382 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (stating that "with the exception of child labor
law violations, only the Secretary of Labor may seek an order to restrain violations of
the FLSA"), affd, 91 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1996).
30 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269.
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officials who act as Holmesian bad men would have little to lose, and
much to gain, by resisting compliance with the FLSA unless and until
31
an injunction is obtained.
Of course, state officials do not generally act as bad men: routine
rule-following, respect for the law, and desire to avoid the burdens of
litigation often will induce compliance with federal duties. In some
instances, however, these factors may operate only weakly, and then
the threat of retrospective organizational liability will be an important
enforcement technique in the public as in the private sector. Among
the situations where such liability is of particular importance are those
in which the scope of federal duties is uncertain or the cost of compliance is very high; in such cases, the prospect of liability for non-compliance may induce greater care in considering whether federal law
32
truly permits the conduct in question.
31

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 692 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Absent any remedy which may act with retroactive effect, state welfare officials have everything to gain and nothing to lose by failing to comply with
the congressional mandate that assistance be paid with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. This is not idle speculation without basis in
practical experience. In this very case, for example, Illinois officials have
knowingly violated since 1968 federal regulations on the strength of an argument as to its invalidity which even the majority deems unworthy of discussion.... Without a retroactive-payment remedy, we are indeed faced with
"the spectre of a state, perhaps calculatingly, defying federal law and thereby
depriving welfare recipients of the financial assistance Congress thought it
was giving them."
Id. (quotingJordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1972)); see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies,
104 HAuv. L. REV. 1731, 1793 (1991) (noting that broad refusals to issue retroactive
remedies based on expansive conceptions of new law "threaten the maintenance of
an appropriate structure of incentives to learn and comply with constitutional [or
other federal] rules").
In a related vein, Vicki Jackson suggested to me in conversation that the Alden
decision reduces the incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers to devote time to seeking out-ofcourt resolutions with state officials, and for state officials to be receptive to such
approaches, for only when an injunctive order is secured does the government face
the possibility (through contempt sanctions) of monetary liability to a private plaintiff
for noncompliance with federal law. See infra note 48. Alden thus strengthens the
incentives of plaintiffs to go to court immediately and of defendants to use delaying
tactics.
32 John Jeffi-ies has objected to unlimited governmental damage liability in the
context of actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). He would restrict such liability to
situations in which state actors are at fault, which he would determine by applying a
test analogous to existing qualified immunity doctrine in § 1983 actions. SeeJohn C.
Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47,
50-51 (1998). It is not clear whetherJeffries would extend his analysis to violations of
statutory duties like those under the FLSA or federal intellectual property laws. How-

1018

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 75:3

Alden does not, of course, limit enforcement to injunctive actions.
But while it leaves open two avenues for obtaining retrospective damages relief, both have serious shortcomings. The first is for injured
parties to sue state officers personally for damages.3 3 Without more,
the resulting regime would be inadequate for plaintiffs, intolerable for
state governments, and unfair to state officials.3 4 Such a regime
would, however, in turn pressure states to indemnify their officials, a
move in the direction of governmental liability.3 5 Yet it is too easy, in

my view, to equate officer liability accompanied by indemnification
with direct governmental liability.3 6 To begin with, here too, Congress would need to ensure that a range of statutes applicable to state
governments in fact impose monetary liability on individual officers,

ever, his analysis is policy-driven; he does not suggest that the Constitution demands
his preferred regime. See id. at 51.
For present purposes, what is important is that the Alden rule does not address
the problem that concerns Jeffries. Even if one agrees with his analysis, one would
want a fault requirement whether the nominal defendant was a state or local government or an individual officer. Alden, by contrast, leaves open the possibility that individual officers (in their personal capacity) or local governments might be held liable
even when not "at fault" while precluding the imposition of retrospective liability
upon state governments even when their "fault" for having violated federal law is undisputed. See also Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 249, 272.
A recent manuscript of Daryl Levinson argues that the imposition of constitutional damages liability upon governmental units for torts and takings is ineffectual
because governments fail to internalize the costs of constitutional remedies; some
aspects of his argument would seem to extend to governmental damages liability in
general. See DarylJ. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2000). While Levinson's argument seems to me exaggerated, for present purposes the critical point is
that it, like Jeffries's argument, is a functional one about the desirable allocation of
liability; unlike the Alden opinion, Levinson does not make a constitutional argument
that Congress, even if it seeks to impose governmental liability, should be precluded
from doing so. See id.
33 See Regents v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997); Jeffries, supra note 32, at 49.
34 See generally PETER SCHUCY, SUING GOVERNMENT (1981).
35 See Fallon & Meltzer, supranote 31, at 1823; Jeffries, supranote 32, at 62. Indeed, Kramer and Sykes have argued that if one makes certain heroic assumptions,
individual and entity liability are indistinguishable. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note
32, at 272.
36 For an argument that views the two regimes as being closer to parity than I
would, but that acknowledges the limitations of simpler assertions of parity as well as
many of the pertinent uncertainties, see Jeffries, supra note 32, at 49-50, 62-66, and
see also Carlos Manuel Vzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity 2, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1775 (1997).
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amending existing provisions when necessary. 37 'Beyond that, the idea

of personal liability would in some cases be jarring: imagine if the
state director of revenue or of public assistance, for example, were
personally liable for the "refund" of past taxes that had been collected, or for payment of past welfare benefits that had been denied,
in violation of federal law-even if the amounts involved totaled millions of dollars. 38 In addition, such a regime would require sometimes difficult and burdensome determinations of which official(s)
should be held personally liable for illegal action.3 9 For that and a
range of other reasons,juries may hesitate to award adequate damages
against individual officers serving the public under often difficult conditions. 4° And even with complete indemnification, officials might
well have grounds to fear the entry of significant judgments against
them personally. 4 1 Moreover, indemnification, though generally
thought to be widespread, is not universal: for example, some employ-

37 The FLSA's substantive wage and hour provisions impose liability only on "employers," see 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997), but that term is broadly
defined to "include(] any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee." Id. § 203(d). Most courts have ruled that an
employer's agent who exercises supervisory authority over an employee's wages and
hours may be jointly and severally liable with the employing organization, see, e.g.,
Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1983), although some of the holdings in
this line relate to the owners or chief executive officers of small businesses, see, e.g.,
United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enter., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995), and thus
might not support imposing liability, for example, on a middle manager in a large
bureaucracy. Moreover, one circuit has taken the quite different view that individual
supervisors are never personally liable under the FLSA. See Wascura v. Carver, 169
F.3d 683, 686 (11th Cir. 1999).
Individual liability is less certain still under other federal statutes. For example,
considerable authority denies that individual defendants may be held personally liable for damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See, e.g., Butler v. Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736,
743-44 (10th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
38 In this regard, the Alden Court's endorsement of personal liability included an
ambiguous qualification: "Even a suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a
state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly
attributableto the officer himself,so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury
but from the officer personally." Alden, 119 S. CL at 2267-68 (emphasis added).
Whether the Court meant to suggest a limit on congressional power to impose liability
on state officers for particular state action to which they had only a limited connection remains to be seen.
39

See supra note 38.

40

See, e.g., Jeffiies, supra note 32, at 50-51.

41

See id.
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ees or agencies may (advertently or otherwise) be excluded; 42 indem-

nification may be permissive rather than mandatory4 3 (though
admittedly a routine practice of permissive indemnification may blunt
any distinction); some states impose monetary limits on indemnification; 44 and many indemnification provisions exclude conduct that is
criminal, egregious, willful, or the like. 45 Given these kinds of gaps, to

shift damages liability from state governments to state officials would
at a minimum have the most serious transition costs.
Finally, even universal indemnification may not be equivalent to
governmental liability. Consider a case like Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,4 6 where the state's retrospective liability for having
collected an unconstitutional tax was estimated to be several hundred
million dollars. Even if positive law authorized suit against the official
who directed the state revenue department for those enormous sums,
assume that the official's net worth was $100,000. If a $200 million
judgment were entered against the official, would the state, because of
its indemnification policy, simply write a check for that amount to the
plaintiffs? A state indemnification law could surely be written to require that result, and some may, but there is also authority suggesting
that a government's obligation to indemnify does not mature at the
time that a judgment is entered against an indemnitee but only when
the indemnitee has sustained a loss by actual payment of the judgment.4 7 One could surely imagine that a state faced with a $200 mil42 See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Authorizing or Requiring Governmental Unit to Indemnify Public Officer or Employee for Liability
Arising out of Performance of PublicDuties, 71 A.L.R.3d 90 (1976).
43 That is the case in my home state of Massachusetts. See MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch.
258, § 9 (1992).
44 See id. (setting a one million dollar limit).
45 See, e.g., A.A. CODE § 11-47-24 (1992 & Lexis Supp. 1999) (requiring state agencies to indemnify employees from anyjudgment arising out of performance of official
duties except where the employee's conduct was "intentional or willful or wanton");
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-110 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (requiring public entities to defend and indemnify employees from judgments arising out of official conduct, except where conduct was "willful and wanton").
46 509 U.S. 86, 129 (1993).
47 That appears to be the case in my home state of Massachusetts. SeeFilippone v.
Mayor of Newton, 452 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983). The Filipponedecision
was reversed by the state's highest court, whose opinion cast some doubt on the usefulness, in the specific circumstances of the case, of a distinction between broad indemnity for liability of an indemnitee (which would be established simply by entry of
a judgment) and a more limited indemnity for losses suffered by the indemnitee
(which would be established only by payment or execution of the judgment). The
court did not, however, reject the distinction more generally. See Filippone v. Mayor
of Newton, 467 N.E.2d 182, 186-87 (Mass. 1984); see also Restivo v. Town of Swansea,
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lion judgment would take the view that it would indemnify the official
to the extent of any execution of the judgment (e.g., the value of bank
accounts or real estate seized, or of wages garnished) but would refuse
to pay the plaintiffs more than that-perhaps in turn leading to a setflement likely to be closer to $100,000 than to $200 million.
Thus, the first option for damages actions that Alden leaves
open-relying on the imposition of personal liability coupled with indemnification-may not in fact be tantamount to the alternative that
Alden prohibits-governmental liability. But even if the former in fact
worked no differently from the latter, Alden and Seminole Tribe would
simply mean that Congress could indirectly achieve the result those
cases prohibit, but in order to do so would have to (a) amend a
number of federal enactments to make them provide for personal liability of state officials, and (b) impose a personal liability that is sufficiently harsh to ensure that state governments effectively have no
choice but to provide universal indemnification to the full extent of
any judgments entered against state officials. That kind of federal
pressure, even if it were to provide an adequate substitute for governmental liability, hardly seems like a blow for harmonious federalism. 48
The other possibility for damages liability that remains viable after Alden is suit by the United States on behalf of the victims of federal
violations-a course that the FLSA expressly authorizes.4 9 Here too,
however, in order to avail itself of this technique more generally, Congress would have to amend other statutory schemes (for example, patent and copyright laws) under which, at present, no federal agency
has authority to bring suit. And one should not underestimate what a
dramatic shift in enforcement techniques would be required. For example, under the FLSA, private suits (whether against private or pub495 N.E.2d 838, 839 (Mass. 1986) (holding, in a suit by plaintiffs against a town seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the town to pay the plaintiffs the amount of unsatisfied judgments obtained by them against town police officers, that the applicable
indemnification provision "does not require the defendant town to satisfy the plaintiffi' . .. judgments against the town's police officers").

48 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 48. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 & n.17
(1978), an action against state officials, the Court affirmed an order awarding the
plaintiffs certain attorney's fees, to be paid out of the state treasury-an order that the
Court treated as analogous to compensatory contempt. In rejecting the argument
that the order violated the 11th Amendment because it required payment by the state
rather than by the officials, the Court declared that to have made the officials liable

for the fee award "would be a remarkable way to treat individuals who have relied on
the Attorney General to represent their interests throughout this litigation," id. at 692
n.19-despite the possibility, mentioned in the Hutto dissent, see id. at 716 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), that state law permitted indemnification.

49

See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994).
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lic employers) outnumber suits by the United States by a ratio of
roughly ten to one. 50 Though I doubt that statistic would have surprised the majority, it does cast doubt on the Court's cavalier suggestion that the lawsuit in Alden must not have been that important
because "the United States apparently found [the federal interest in
compensating the State's employees for past violations of federal law]
insufficient tojustify sending even a single attorney to Maine to prose51
cute this litigation."
Of course, a Congress devoted to full enforcement could in theory both confer broad enforcement authority on federal agencies
(where necessary, creating new ones) and sharply increase appropriations. But the implausibility of such a response goes far beyond
doubts that the current Congress would be so inclined. 52 For it has
long been noted that the budgets of public enforcement agencies
"tend to be small in relation to the potential gains from enforcement
53
as they would be appraised by a private, profit-maximizing enforcer."
Nor does the fact that a violator of federal law is a state agency necessarily provide a reason for public enforcement; if a university has denied overtime wages to an employee, or infringed a patent, it is hard
to see why the appropriate enforcement strategy should differ if the
violator is Penn State (a state school) rather than the University of
Pennsylvania (a private one). Indeed, Congress may reasonably doubt
that federal governmental resources are wisely used to pursue litigation against state agencies when a private rightholder's interest is
great but the public interest may be small.
50 The following statistics are compiled from the Report of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts on the Judicial Business of the United States Courts
for 1997 and 1998, Hd. C-2 (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http://www.USCourts.gov/judicialbusiness/c02Sep97.pdf>.
CIVIL CASES COMMENCED IN U.S. DisTRiCr COURTS UNDER THE FLSA

1997
1998

U.S. as Plaintiff

Other Plaintiff

Total Cases

143
150

1490
1412

1633
1562

These statistics do not distinguish suits against states from those against other defendants. Since private plaintiffs sometimes file in state court but the United States virtually never does, these federal court statistics may slightly understate the ratio of

private-plaintiff cases to U.S.-as-plaintiff cases.
51 119 S.Ct. at 2269.
52 See generally Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New ConstitutionalOrder and the Chastening of ConstitutionalAspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 26, 51-56 (1999) (highlighting

impediments to national action arising from the existing configuration of political
forces).
53

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
36 (1975).
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Moreover, public and private enforcement are different animals.
Government bureaucracies may respond far less quickly than private
lawyers to shifting demand for enforcement action, and even decentralized governmental bureaucracies are likely to be less convenient
and flexible than are private lawyers. The point is not that private
enforcement of damage remedies against states is always superior to
public enforcement, but rather that it often will be superior, and thus
there are considerable costs to holding private enforcement
unconstitutional.
The Court does not concern itself with these issues, but stresses
instead that when states must pay damages in suits by the United
States, the enforcement action is taken by politically responsible officials. 54 Perhaps the Court is offering a novel extension of the familiar
political safeguards of federalism argument-suggesting that such
safeguards should restrain not only the exercise of legislative authority
but also the decision whether to sue a state that has violated congressionally-created duties. Those safeguards may indeed operate in
broadly similar fashion on both federal political branches. 55 That sim54 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
55 Evan Caminker has recently suggested a different point of view: "federal prosecutors have no duty of loyalty to states per se, and thus it seems dubious that they
would refrain from initiating an otherwise promising suit out of an abstract respect
for the states's dignitary interests." Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits
by the United States, 98 MIci. L. REV. 92, 122 (1999). My own belief-based in part
upon recollections from working at the Department of Health Education and Welfare
in the Carter Administration-is that a broader view of federal enforcement would
reveal a great deal more complexity than is found in Caminker's picture of prosecutors making discrete decisions whether a particular case is meritorious. In federal
agencies, regulation frequently involves a complex of techniques-information gathering, informal oversight, notice of non-compliance, negotiation of remedial plansand litigation is often a last resort. In that environment, deciding what is a "promising suit-that is, an occasion for litigation rather than for other approaches to securing compliance-may not be clearcut. Additional unclarity about whether to bring a
"promising suit-for example, against Maine for violation of the FLSA-arises because such a decision is likely to implicate the question whether to allocate scarce
resources to suing the state or, instead, to bringing a "promising suit" against a private
regulatee.
In making decisions that are, it seems to me, less open and shut than Caminker
suggests, officials are often operating in a somewhat politicized environment. While
Caminker's primary concern is with qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, in
which the federal enforcers are located in the Justice Department, federal "prosecutors" often are not officials in the Department ofJustice; the Department of Labor,
for example, is the agency authorized to bring suit to enforce the FLSA. While efforts
to influence Department ofJustice officials may be viewed as particularly inappropriate, officials in an executive agency like the Department of Labor routinely are involved in discussion with both regulatees and with "political" actors in the Executive
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ilarity is particularly likely if one agrees, as I do, with Larry Kramer
that the political safeguards today are strongly buttressed by, if not
primarily located in, a complex web of extra-constitutional political
institutions (like political parties and organizations representing state
and local governments) and complex connections among officials in
56 And
parties, organizations, and the various levels of governments.
indeed, only recently President Clinton promulgated an Executive Order-albeit, according to newspaper reports, as a defensive effort to
forestall more far-reaching legislation 57-designed to ensure, inter
alia, that actions taken by the executive branch do not limit the policymaking discretion of the states except as necessary and only after
58
consultation with state and local officials.
Whether or not the Executive Order is a wise measure, it does not
create any rights or immunities that are judicially enforceable-much
less immunities that are constitutionally protected from revision in the
ordinary political process. 59 Indeed, one could view the new ExecuOffice of the President or on Capitol Hill. In that environment, agency officials may
not infrequently be wary of suing a state, not so much because of an abstract respect
for state "dignity," but rather because they may have been subjected to, or fear becoming subject to, political pressure-whether directly from the states themselves, or indirectly through the intervention of other government officials who in turn are
responding to state pressure.
Having said this, I would note that my phrasing in text-that the political safeguards may operate in "broadly similar fashion" on legislative and executive officials-is not inconsistent with the view, which I would espouse, that the political
culture of members of the House and the Senate, and of their staffs, is in general
more responsive to political pressure from states than is that of officials in executive
agencies. In that respect, the political safeguards may be more robust in the legislative than in the executive branch. In other respects, however, the political safeguards
may be more effective in forestalling federal litigation than in forestalling federal legislation: in the legislative process, states may be less likely to have advance notice that
adverse action is about to be taken, whereas a government lawsuit is likely to follow a
crystallized dispute known to state officials; moreover, identification of a single critical
decisionmaker with control over executive enforcement may be easier than identification in Congress of a particular legislator who plainly has the power to control a legislative outcome.
More broadly, however, Caminker and I agree that, however one describes the
behavior of executive enforcement officials, the Court in Alden fails to offer a convincing reason for permitting only federal officials to seek retrospective damages liability
against unconsenting states for their violation of federal laws enacted under Article I.
56 See Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 V~AN. L. Rv. 1485, 1522-60
(1994).
57 Stephen Laboton, Anti-Federalism Measures Have BipartisanSupport, N.Y. TiMss,
Sept. 6, 1999, at A12.
58 Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999).
59 See id. § 11.
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five Order, and the congressional activity that may have stimulated it,
as evidence that the political safeguards retain some potency. Over
time, one might expect that in some periods or in some federal agencies, state and local officials will have very limited influence in executive branch decisions, while in other periods or agencies their
influence will be stronger-perhaps in some instances, so strong as to
steer federal officials away from important national action that should
be taken.60 The contrast between the ebb and flow of such forces and
the Alden ruling is striking. For under Alden, even after both Houses
of Congress and the President have overcome state resistance and
joined in a clear statement creating federal rights against the state,
those rights may be fully enforced only if subsequent administrations
are so inclined in the face of resource constraints and possible ongoing opposition from state and local governments. Alden precludes
Congress and the President from enacting legislation that makes available a very traditional form of redress-private suits for damages
against the regulated entity-when that remedy is thought desirable
in order to guarantee an ongoing and politically insulated basis for
full enforcement of federal law. The preclusion of that remedy seems
to cut against, rather than in favor of, political accountability.
Indeed, one can say more broadly that the course of sovereign
immunity decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts represents
more of an obstacle to than a reaffirmation of notions of democratic
accountability. The example of the FLSA itself is noteworthy. Congress first enacted the statute in 1938,61 and nearly thirty years later, in
1966, extended the Act to cover certain public employees for the first
time. After a 1973 Supreme Court decision held that the 1966 amendments had not purported to lift the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity,6 2 Congress in 1974 again amended the FLSA to make clear
that suits like that in Alden could be filed in either state or federal
court, and at the same time broadened the Act's coverage of public
employees. 63 But Alden, coupled with Seminole Tribe, tells Congress
that if it is serious about retrospective enforcement of liabilities, it
must amend the FLSA still again so as to authorize some combination
of (a) private injunctive actions, (b) damage actions against state officials personally, and (c) increased federal enforcement capacity-

60

See generally DAVID L. SHAPmO, FEDERALISM: A DALOGUE 107-40 (1995).

61
62

See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1998).
See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health

& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 283 (1973).
63

See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C § 216(b) (1994).
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and, if the last approach is to be effective, must vastly increase appropriations to the Department of Labor year after year.
The net result of the Court's decision in Alden thus seems to be
that Congress may regulate the states, but in the end will lack the
practical tools necessary to do so with maximum effectiveness. One
can argue about whether the shortcomings in the alternatives to private damage actions against the states leave the enforcement glass half
full or half empty. But the Court never explains what sense it makes
"for states to be subject to federal regulation [under the FLSA] but to
enjoy immunity with respect to major techniques of enforcement of
that regulation. '6 4 Indeed, there is some considerable tension between the Court's arguments that (a) even without private suits
against state treasuries, federal enforcement will not suffer, and (b)
those private suits are so distinctively offensive or intrusive as to be
unconstitutional.
The Alden decision also raises a question about whether private
damage actions against local governments will be treated differently
from those against states. 65 Under the Eleventh Amendment, local
governments, unlike state governments or their agencies, have no immunity from suit in federal court. 66 That distinction, though peculiar
in many respects, is well-entrenched. Indeed, the Alden opinion relies
on it in distinguishing Howlett v. Rose67 -a decision that had recognized a state court's obligation to entertain a damage action against a
school board-on the ground that the defendant there was not an
arm of the state but merely a local government and as such had no
immunity from damages liability. 68 But while the Alden Court thus reaffirmed the state/local distinction, the Court's reasoning may ultimately work to undermine it. For the immunity that Alden recognized
was based not on the Eleventh Amendment (whose text is limited to
suits in federal court and to suits against states) but on broader princi64 HART & WECHSLER'S 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note *, at 136.
65 See id. Professor Jackson puts the question another way: Why, if local governments have no 11th Amendment immunity, should they be protected by related principles of federalism (specifically, the anti-commandeering rule of Printz)? See
Jackson, supra note 1, at 2194.
66 On the origins of this distinction, see RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIELJ. MELTZER,

&

DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYsTEM 1056-57 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
CouRS].
67 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
68 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2259. Howlett also relied on the ground that the state
court's unwillingness to entertain a federal law action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994),
while entertaining analogous state law claims against local school boards, constituted
unlawful discrimination against federal rights. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378-81.
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ples of immunity said to be rooted in constitutional structure and reinforced by the Tenth Amendment.69 (No longer can one say that
"the [Tenth A]mendment states but a truism." 70 ) The same sources
ur
iderlay the anti-commandeering decision in Printz-which recognized a form of constitutional immunity extending to local governments and their officials, and in so doing declared that the distinction
between states and municipalities "is peculiar to the question of
whether a governmental entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity" and has no bearing on "the question of whether
a governmental entity is protected by the Constitution's guarantees of
federalism, including the Tenth Amendment." 71 Indeed, the Alden
Court in turn relied on Printz as support for the proposition that "our
federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in
the governance of the Nation."72 And moving from precedent to policy, it is a familiar point that the litany of values associated with federalism, particularly those related to political participation, often are
most fully realized by local rather than by state governments. 73 One
wonders whether one of the few limits on state sovereign immunity
that the Court has consistently observed-that it shields only the state
or arms of the state, and not local governments-will be maintained. 74
III.

IMMUN=IY AND THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM

The issue presented in Alden-when may states claim immunity
in their own courts from federal suit-had never been squarely resolved; 75 no constitutional text addresses it; the constitutional history,
as the warring opinions in Alden demonstrated, was hardly uniform or
69 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247, 2259.
70 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
71 Printz, 521 U.S. at 931 n.15. Although the majority in Printz gave the 10th
Amendment only a bit part, two members of the majority made that provision more
central to the reasoning in their concurring opinions. See id. at 935 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 936-39 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2259.
73 For an example of this argument, see Richard Briffault, "Wat About the 'sm'?"
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism 47 VAN. L. REV. 1303, 1311
(1994).
74 Thus, for example, Richard Seamon-who agrees with the Alden Court that
states should generally be immune in their own courts from private suit under federal
law, and who would base that immunity on the 10th Amendment and the anti-commandeering principle-argues that the immunity should extend to suits against local
governments. See Richard Seamon, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts,
37 BRANDEIS L.J. 318, 389-90 (1998-99).

75

See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 57.
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clear; and precedents could be adduced-and distinguished-on
both sides of the issue.7 6 When facing such an issue, the Court might
appropriately consider not merely a decision's consequences for the
effectiveness of federal regulation and the range of enforcement
choices open to Congress, but also the extent to which that decision
fits with the values underlying a federal structure. Those values have
been recited in prior decisions and extensive commentary and are almost mind-numbingly familiar: 77 facilitating political participation in
smaller units; permitting a closer match of citizen preferences and
governmental policy than is available at the national level, thereby fostering citizen choice and inter-jurisdictional competition; providing
opportunities for experimentation as well as for diverse approaches;
and providing a set of political counterweights to the national government so as to prevent tyranny. Critics of Alden might question this
litany, expressing doubts about whether all of the functional values
associated with federalism should be viewed as having constitutional
roots, 78 whether those values are promoted by federalism as much as

by localism and decentralization (which could be promoted by a unitary, national government), 7 9 and whether in any event opposing values favor national and uniform solutions.8 0 But even if one simply
accepts the conventional litany, one would still want to ask whether it
supports the doctrinal pattern with which we are left after Aldenpermitting federal imposition of duties on a "state qua statd'8 ' but at
76 Elaborate discussions of the precedents are found in the parties' briefs in Alden
and in a number of law review articles. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, StateJudges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe and Printz, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 1465;
Seamon, supra note 74; VWzquez, supra note 36; Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity
and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courtsfor Constitutional
Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1981); Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property,
and Sovereign Immunity, 75 NORE DAME LAW REVIEW 919 (2000).
77 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-21 (1997); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469

U.S. 528, 568-72 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally SHAPIRO, supranote 60.
78 Cf Samuel H. Beer, Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America, 72 AM.
POL. Sc. REV. 9, 15 (1978) (noting that the convention and ratification debates made
little of the argument that federalism helps to accommodate levels of government to
territorial diversity).
79 See, e.g., Adler & Kreimer, supra note 1, at 77 (citing additional sources); Briffault, supranote 73; Malcolm Feeley, The Fundamentalityand Irrelevance ofFederalism, 13
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1009 (1997); Jackson, supra note 1, at 2213-14, 2217-28 (citing
additional sources; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
80 For a masterful exposition of the arguments on both sides of the question, see
SHAPMIRO, supra note 60.
81 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847 (1976).
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the same time barring enforcement of those duties through private
damage actions against those same state entities.
Of the litany of federalism values, the two to which the Court's
federalism decisions have given the greatest prominence are (1) maintaining political accountability-presumably so as to permit effective
electoral control of both levels of government as well as a transparent
82
competition for political allegiance-and (2) preventing tyranny.
Of these two, the political accountability concern has been the primary basis for the anti-commandeering decisions. And perhaps if, as
Garcia suggested, protection of state autonomy is going to rest substantially on the political process, that protection requires clear lines
of accountability (although the Court's position that such accountability is impaired by federal commandeering of state and local legislative
and executive processes has been forcefully contested).83
Whether or not the anti-commandeering argument in the end is
84
convincing, no similar argument could support the result in Alden.
82

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 920-23 (political accountability); id. at 921 (prevention

of tyranny); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (political accountability); id. at 552 (prevention
of tyranny); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (political accountability); id. at 181 (prevention of tyranny); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
473 (1991) (political accountability); id. at 458-59 (prevention of tyranny).
The relative emphasis on these considerations is no surprise, as the other considerations typically put forward-matching preferences, permitting citizen choice and
exit, permitting social experimentation-have less to do with federal regulation of the
states themselves than with locating governmental regulation of private actors and
governmental spending decisions at some sub-national level of government. Moreover, the persuasiveness of these other considerations depends upon a complex of
empirical and shifting factors (should the national government permit greater flexibility in income maintenance arrangements, or is redistribution a distinctively
national responsibility;, do the values of uniform national standards outweigh the benefits of experimentation in a specific areas?) particularly unsuited to judicial evaluation. Accord Andrej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
FederalismAfter Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 409.
83 See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 1, at 98-102; Caminker, supra note 1, at
1061-72; Caminker, supra note 14, at 220-31; Jackson, supra note 1, at 2195-2205.
84 Probably the key difficulty for any theory that seeks tojustify the anti-commandeering principle is to explain why commandeering is more constitutionally offensive
than the recognized power to preempt state regulation altogether. Several commentators have explored whether one mightjustify a distinction between commandeering
and preemption based on notions that mandated action is more offensive than mandated inaction. See, e.g., Adler & Kreimer, supranote 1, at 93; Caminker, supra note 1,
at 1055 n.218.
With regard to the goal of tyranny prevention, Adler and Kreimer suggest that
although, at first blush, liberty may be more threatened by government action than by
inaction, in the end that claim is unpersuasive. See Alder & Kreimer, supra note 1, at
98-101. Moreover, the suggested distinction assumes that the alternative to federal
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Imagine the objections that a contrary result in Alden would, to use
the current idiom, have commandeered the state courts, constituted
commandeering of the states is the absence of regulation; it may, instead, be direct
federal regulation with a larger federal apparatus and the absence of state participation that might otherwise have served as a counterweight to federal overreaching. See
Caminker, supra note 1, at 1014.
With respect to the value of promoting local political communities, Adler and
Kreimer also note the "sense" that commandeering "seems, somehow, to be more of
an interference with state autonomy than a requirement that they refrain from enacting a particular statute." Adler and Kreimer, supra note 1, at 94. In the end, however,
they conclude that neither that intuitive sense nor consideration of other values of
federalism can justify the preemption/commandeering distinction, noting that either
technique limits the options available to self-governing political communities. See id.
at 95-101.
With regard to the value of political accountability, if federal commandeering
risks misallocation of responsibility from federal to state officials for actions the latter
undertake only under federal compulsion, so federal preemption risks misallocation
of responsibility from federal to state officials for the latter's failure to undertake
action that federal law prohibits. See id. at 99; Caminker, supra note 1, at 1061-74;
Jackson, supra note 1, at 2200-05.
Rick Hills has defended an anti-commandeering rule in part as preventing forced
speech and in part on a complicated functional argument about when federal compulsion of states, as distinguished from federal purchase of services from states, is
required. See Hills, supra note 1. The argument about compelled speech, it seems to
me, also fails to distinguish preemption: if commandeering is forced speech, then
preemption is suppression of speech, which should be equally suspect. Hills's complex functional argument is based on the view that the government should have to
purchase rather than commandeer state regulatory services, and that doing so will not
impair national policy. While the argument is nuanced and sophisticated, at bottom
it remains quite uncertain that it adequately distinguishes commandeering from preemption (which in theory could also be purchased). SeeAdler & Kreimer, supranote
1, at 101-02.
Finally, it is not clear that Hills's general argument about commandeering is particularly apt with regard to the rule of Alden. It is hard to think of a requirement that
state judges articulate and enforce federal law-whether in private suits or in suits
against the states-as "compelled speech"-particularly since their obligation to engage in such "compelled speech" when federal law arises by way of defense seems
uncontroversial. Nor, as he recognizes, see Hills, supra note 1, at 928-33, is his concern about federal expropriation of state services limited to a federal obligation that
state courts entertain suits against the states; the concern is equally applicable to the
long-recognized obligation of state courts to entertain federal actions against private
parties when they entertain analogous state law actions. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 396 (1946). He does suggest that perhaps Testa is misguided and that the Madisonian Compromise-under which Congress need not create inferior federal courts
and may instead rely on state courts to entertain federal claims-should be understood as requiring Congress to purchase the services of state courts. That is a quite
different argument from the Court's, and one that seems to me, even accepting each
step of his rather complicated functional argument, a doubtful interpretation of the
Constitution. See also infra note 85.
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an unfunded mandate, diverted state judicial- energy from state agendas, and confused voters about whom to blame for either (a) the way
state courts allocate resources, or (b) decisions enforcing the FLSA
against state governments.8 5 Those objections would be no more germane to the facts of Alden than to a myriad of other federal obligations that state courts constitutionally must discharge. It is nothing
short of fanciful to think that state political accountability is
threatened by requiring state courts to add damage actions against
state treasuries to the set of federal actions that they must otherwise
entertain-for example, suits of all types against local governments;8 6
suits to enjoin state officials from ongoing violations of federal law;
federal claims against private defendants or against state officials in
their personal capacities (at least so long as states entertain analogous
state law claims);8 7 and suits against states that have waived immunity
in order to gain federal funding. 8 When a state court issues a decision that a state or local government is violating federal law, one
doubts that state voters seeking to allocate responsibility will focus on
the identity of the plaintiff (private party or the United States), the
defendant (state government, local government, or officials), or the
nature of the relief (prospective vs. retrospective). Nor, for that mat85 See Caminker, supranote 1, at 1051-53; Seamon, supranote 74, at 359. In this
vein, Professor Merritt has argued that federal commandeering consumes state political energy in a way that federal preemption does not. See DeborahJ. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 U. FLA. L. REV. 541, 553-55 (1995). The point is undoubtedly
true insofar as it ordinarily is easier to do nothing than to do something. Whether or
not that observation relates importantly to notions of federalism is a different matter;,
requiring state motor vehicle officials to report information to federal authorities
seems less intrusive to state self-governance than does preempting all state motor vehicle regulation. Indeed, the observation may be particularly inapt when applied to the
judiciary, one of whose distinguishing features is its lack of power to set its own
agenda, thus requiring that it devote its adjudicative energy to a set of tasks established by others.
86 I assume existing law under which sovereign immunity does not extend to such
actions. But cf supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
87 See HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 66, at 469-91. Indeed, application of the anti-commandeering principle to state judges would be hard
to square with the one clear implication of cases like Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947)-that state courts may not refuse to entertain federal actions when they entertain analogous state law actions. The majority in Printz, by contrast, was unconcerned
with whether state and local executive officials administered analogous state laws; the
bar on federal compulsion of executive officials in Printz, rather, was unqualified. See
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
88 For a post-Alden decision re-affirming congressional power to condition the
award of federal funds upon a state's waiver of sovereign immunity from suit with
regard to the funded activities-and thus upholding private suit against a state in
federal court-see Litman v. George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999).
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ter, are voters likely to be concerned with whether Congress was legislating under Article I or under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment-or perhaps even with whether challenged action violated state or federal law.
Indeed, if damage actions against state treasuries threaten political accountability, state agendas, and state resource decisions, that is
just as true of the numerous suits in which federal law supplies not the
plaintiff's claim but rather a defense or a procedural requirement
(from constitutional limits on criminal prosecutions to limits on personal jurisdiction to statutory or constitutional defenses to state law
liability). A state court's obligation to apply Eighth Amendment law
in a death penalty case, or the actual malice rule in a defamation action, can consume considerable judicial resources, thus diverting state
courts from other tasks; federal law may control the outcome in a way
that could, in theory, lead voters to hold state judges accountable
merely for carrying out federal obligations. And in cases with federal
defenses, no less than in cases in which federal law supplies the claim,
Congress could have vested jurisdiction in the federal courts by providing for removal once the federal defense was raised. But it has
long been clear that Congress may "commandeer" the state courts to
apply federal law and need not instead give federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over every case or controversy arising under federal law
within the meaning of Article III.
Indeed, the entire political accountability argument seems like a
fish out of water as applied to state judges. While most are indeed
elected,8 9 they are not meant to be politically accountable in the same
way as state legislative and executive officials. (Imagine the campaign
slogan: "Put Smith on the State Supreme Court: She'll Defy the
Supremacy Clause.")
So much for political accountability. As for whether immunity
from state treasury liability is necessary to prevent tyranny, we must
begin with the fact that the A/den decision, although it does not even
cite Garcia, plainly accepts that Congress has legislative authority to
impose FLSA regulation upon state governments and to enforce that
liability through techniques other than private suit against the states.
Thus, judicial enforcement of federal fair labor standards does not so
cripple the states as to prevent them (1) from representing (or from
serving as the basis for organizing) groups (whether insular minorities
or dispersed majorities) that are left out of the national political pro89

See, e.g., Steven Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: ElectiveJudiciaresand the Rule

of Law, 62 U.

CHI.

L. REv. 689, 690 (1995).
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cess, or (2) from combating capture of the federal government by a
special interest distinct from that of the people.90
More complete enforcement of the FLSA, to be sure, would impose additional burdens on the states-burdens thatJustice Kennedy
described in rather draconian terms. He raised the specter that private damage actions could "threaten the financial integrity of the
State" 91 and "create staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and
leverage over the States that is not contemplated by our constitutional
design";92 were the states not immune from private suits, "the course
of their public policy and the administration of their public affairs"
may become "subject to and controlled by the mandates of judicial
tribunals."9 3 Familiar responses exist to all of these objections: the
burdens (staggering is surely an exaggeration of what was at issue in
Alden) exist by virtue of congressional mandates whose constitutionality Garcia affirms; the cost of ongoing compliance with the federal
law-whether through "voluntary" decisions like that of the state of
Maine, after the Alden litigation was filed, to alter its future conduct,
or in other instances through adherence to prospective injunctions
issued at the behest of private suitors-is likely over time to far exceed
the cost of remedying past violations; 9 4 and private damage actions
against local governments have long existed without transforming
them into pawns of the judiciary. 95 Ultimately, as the dissent empha90
91

See generally Rapaczynski, supra note 82, at 380-95.

92

Id.

Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.

93 Id (quoting In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)); see also Seamon, supra note
74, at 366-72.
94 Indeed, NationalLeague of Cities itself was a suit by governmental plaintiffs seeking to enjoin the application to them of the FLSA, and the Court, in upholding their
position, placed considerable weight on the cost and associated burdens of ongoing
compliance with the FISA. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846.

95 Moreover, the Supreme Court has required state courts to entertain private
damage actions against unconsenting states that are of far greater consequence than
the Alden litigation. In this respect, Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994), was an
awkward precedent for the Alden Court. In Reich, the Court unanimously reaffirmed
that absent an adequate predeprivation remedy, a state court must provide a refund
remedy when taxpayers challenge the constitutionality of state taxation-"the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding." Id. at
110. It is hard to square that precedent-and cases in that line that have required
refunds that sometimes reach hundreds of millions of dollars, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 129 (1993)-with the Court's concern in Alden
that suit by Maine probation officers could "turn the State against itself and ultimately
commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the
behest of individuals," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
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sized, 96 any incremental burden imposed by damages liability is required by the rule of law and materializes only when states do not live
up to federal obligations that have constitutionally been imposed. It
would be an odd constitutional theory that Congress may constitutionally regulate state labor standards only if federal law is not very well
enforced.
Reich posed a difficulty for the Alden Court in two additional ways. First, Reich
recognizes the power and obligation of the Supreme Court, even when acting without
a congressional clear statement, to require state courts to impose retrospective liability on state governments. (Efforts to re-cast Reich and McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), as requiring only a remedy against
state officials, rather than against the state-see, e.g., Seamon, supra note 74, at
394-406; Vizquez, supra note 36, at 1770-77-seem to me unpersuasive, and, in any
event, the Alden Court did not follow that line.) One might have thought that imposition of retrospective liability on state treasuries should be more, not less, tolerable
when, as in Alden, it was plainly authorized by the federal political branches. Cf John
E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action Against State Government and the History of the Eleventh and FourteenthAmendments, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 1413
(1975); Laurence H. Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of PowersIssues in Controversies About Federalism,89 HARV. L. REV.
682 (1976).
Second, Reich cannot be accommodated to the majority's theoretical construct.
In order to circumvent the textual limitation of the 11th Amendment to federaljudicial power, the Alden Court reasoned as follows: (a) "the Constitution was understood,
in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States' traditional immunity from
private suits," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2252; (b) Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793), mistakenly interpreted Article III as having stripped states of immunity from
suit in federal court, seeAlden, 119 U.S. at 2252-53; (c) "[a]s the [lth] Amendment
clarified the only provisions of the Constitution [Article III] that anyone had suggested might support a contrary understanding, there was no reason to draft with a
broader brush," id. at 2252; (d) state sovereign immunity therefore derives not from
the 11th Amendment (which is treated as having merely corrected the error of
Chisholm) but from the basic constitutional design, see id. at 2254. On this theory, the
scope of the immunities that states enjoy in state and federal courts should be identical, as they derive from the same source in constitutional history and structure-a
point that the Court's opinion acknowledged. See id. at 2256 ("The logic of the decisions [denying that Congress has power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from
private suit in federal court] ... does not turn on the forum in which the suits were
prosecuted but extends to state-court suits as well."). However, the Court has squarely
held that the 11th Amendment bars a federal action by a taxpayer for a refund from
the state treasury of taxes alleged to have been unconstitutionally exacted. See, e.g.,
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944). The contrasting federal and
state decisions on whether a state is immune from tax refund suits thus belies the
Court's premise in Alden that there is a uniform immunity, rooted in the Constitution-and restored in federal court actions (after the constitutional heresy of
Chisholm) by the 11th Amendment-applicable wherever a state is sued by a private
party.
96 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2288-89 & n.34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Court offers no convincing reason to believe that the
additional burdens of private enforcement against state treasuries
would undercut the capacity of states to compete for the political allegiance of citizens or to serve as a counterweight against national tyranny. Indeed, those capacities of states are hardly promoted by a
constitutional ruling that-insofar as Congress wishes to make state
employers liable to state employees for FLSA violations-privileges
enforcement by an (expanded) federal bureaucracy (whose lawsuits
in practice would likely be filed exclusively in federal court) over pri97
vate enforcement in state court.

Put differently, the Garcia decision entrusted protection of state
autonomy primarily to the national political process, supplemented by
a subsequently-announced rule of clear statement designed to ensure
that state interests were duly considered by Congress.9 The debate
over what exactly those safeguards are, how they operate, and whether
they adequately protect the states is well-known. 99 But so long as those
safeguards are deemed presumptively adequate with regard to the imposition of FLSA liability generally on state employers in the first instance,10 0 there is no reason to think them insufficient with regard to
97 Of course, the Court in Printz was unmoved by any suggestion that federal
"commandeering" of state executive officials to administer federal law-when compared to the alternative of exclusive federal administration-might improve local participation and governmental responsiveness to local problems, "make valuable use of'
the distinctive perspectives of state officials, and promote diversity and experimentation. See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1014. Indeed, similar rationales for relying on
state implementation of federal directives underlay the scheme of the Articles of Confederation. SeeJack N. Rakove, The OriginsofJudicialReiew: A Pleafor New Contexts, 49
STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1043-44 (1997). That that scheme did not work well as the exclusive basis for national action in the chaotic and embryonic stages of nation-building
following the Revolutionary War hardly demonstrates that it would not be a useful, if
relatively uncommon, mode of national action more than two centuries later. See, e.g.,
Caminker, supra note 1, at 1046.
98 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991). Needless to say, there is
considerable tension between Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Gregory
and the Garciaopinion, from which she dissented. SeeYoo, supranote 28, at 1335-40
(contending that Gregory rejects the underlying tenets of Garcia).
99 See generally Kramer, supra note 56.
100 There is, indeed, evidence that the political safeguards of federalism have, in
some cases, helped state and local governments to secure their objectives in the national political process. In 1985, following the Garcia decision, Congress amended
the FLSA to permit state and local governmental employers (unlike their private
counterparts) to provide compensatory time-off rather than premium compensation
for employees who work overtime. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 878 (1985) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(1) (1994).
That same act also exempted legislative employees from protection, while several
other provisions of the current law accommodate particular concerns of governmen-
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the authorization of damages liability in private ELSA suits. In the
end, one is hard pressed to see the distinctive set of limits that the
Court has established, and the national powers that it has preserved,
as responsive to or promoting any theory of constitutional federalism.
The majority offered one additional argument that related in a
somewhat different manner to conceptions of constitutional federalism. It contended that its result was sound because the contrary result
would create an anomaly-that federal rights could be fully enforced
in state but not in federal court. The point is not without some force;
as I have argued before,' 0 ' there is some tension between Seminole
Tribe (recognizing an insurmountable Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court suit) and the dissenters' position in Alden (refusing to recognize a commensurate immunity from state court suit).
If states are to be liable for damages in private suits to enforce federal
laws, it is hard to see why federal courts should not hear those actions.
Seminole Tribe, however, had foreclosed that approach. For some,
like me, it is the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
that is anomalous. But that interpretation is, for the moment, wellentrenched. Against that background, the question becomes which
additional anomaly is greater: (1) preserving congressional authority
to deploy private suits as a mechanism for enforcing federal law, but
only in state court, or (2) recognizing a non-textual immunity from
private suit in all courts, thereby truncating federal legislative power
fully to enforce valid congressional duties.
My view that the second anomaly is the more profound one is
supported by the existence of arguments that it does make sense to
uphold state court obligation while denying federal court power to
entertain private damage actions. 10 2 (Although these arguments do
not persuade me that Seminole Tribe was correct, they seem to me well
short of being anomalous.) If one starts with the Court's view that
state liability in private actions is a particularly sensitive matter, one
might view the interposition of state judges as a useful buffer.'0 3 State
tal employers. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2) (C) (1994) (exempting certain positions
from overtime requirements); id. § 207(k) (1994) (establishing special overtime rules
for law enforcement personnel). Needless to say, state and local government interests
do not always prevail in Congress, nor has the national legislative process always focused very clearly on whether federal regulation should extend to state and local governments. See generally Carol F. Lee, The PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism? Congressional

Responses to Supreme CourtDecisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URn. LAw 301 (1988).
101 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 57-59.
102 For an overlapping but somewhat different set of arguments, see Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
LJ. 1, 88-104 (1988).
103

See id. at 99-100.
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courts, one assumes, will be particularly sympathetic to state interests

and particularly likely to avail themselves of whatever flexibility federal
law provides to avoid imposing untoward burdens on state political
branches. Giving states the right to be sued only in courts of their
own creation rather than in those of a distinct sovereign-a home
court advantage that, by its nature, is not, possessed by other liti10 4 Ingants-could be viewed as respecting their dignity and status.
deed, two years to the day earlier, Justice Kennedy, in his opinion in
Idaho v. Coeur dAlene Tribe,10 5 had said precisely that: "The dignity and
status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment
immunity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own
06
courts, which are open to hear and determine the case."'
Justice Kennedy's position in Coeur d'Alene Tribe is echoed in
other jurisdictional doctrines. Indeed, the arguments for reading the
Eleventh Amendment as giving the states an immunity only from federal court suit underlie the various abstention doctrines that the
Supreme Court has established-doctrines that deem it preferable in
particular circumstances to have federal issues litigated in state than
in federal court. 0 7 Similarly, the Johnson Act' 08 and the Tax Injunction Act' 0 9 channel specified federal causes of action exclusively to
state court. (The Tax Injunction Act echoes Alden's concern about
the sensitivity of judicial orders that directly affect state treasuries.)
Rather than viewing these jurisdictional arrangements as anomalous,
the Court has embraced them with considerable enthusiasm."10
104 See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 41 (1994); see also
Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 293-94 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result).
The issue is not the general immunity of the States from private suit-a question of the common law-but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit
before federal tribunals. Because of the problems of federalism inherent in
making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has long been
considered to be appropriate in a case such as this.
Id.
105 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
106 Id. at 287 (plurality opinion).
107 See generally HART & WEcnsizx:'s Tim FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 66, at
1247-1308; see, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943).

108 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
109 Id § 1341 (1994).
110 The enthusiasm is particularly notable with regard to the Younger doctrine, see,
e.g., HART & WECHSLER'S Ti-E FEDERAL CoURTrs, supra note 66, at 1256-75, and decisions concerning the Tax Injunction Act, see, e.g., id. at 1216-22.
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STATE DIGNrrY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The Court did not, in fact, seek to justify its decision in Alden with
a careful analysis of the relationship of the new immunity it recognized to the purposes of constitutional federalism. Instead, the
Court's normative defense of state sovereign immunity rested on two
somewhat more abstract notions: the dignity of states and the sovereignty of states.
The notion that sovereign immunity protects the dignity of states
has been more prominent in decisions of the 1990s than it was in
earlier decades."' 1 "Congress," the Court declares in Alden, "must
In any event, the majority's approach creates other anomalies. One that David
Shapiro pointed out to me can be made concrete with this hypothetical: Suppose
Nevada employees were to spend several months living in California to study the operation of its public university system. If the employees work more than 40 hours a
week and Nevada denies them overtime pay, Seminole Tribe indicates that they cannot
sue Nevada in a federal court, and Alden now adds that they likewise cannot sue in
Nevada state court. However, under Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), they may be
able to sue the state of Nevada in California state court. My hypothetical can be distinguished from Hal, where the claim against Nevada was based on California tort law
rather than on federal law, but the position that Nevada has greater immunity from
federal law than from the law of a sister state seems impossible to justify.
In the example given, the constitutionality of California's exercise of personal
jurisdiction would not seem to be in doubt, given the ample "minimum contacts"
between the defendant state of Nevada and the forum state of California. And more
generally, if state lines are not themselves of significance in restricting the federal
government when establishing personal jurisdiction over civil cases in the federal
courts, see HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 66, at 1587-88, it is
far from clear that they should hamper the federal government in authorizing the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by state courts over those same federal civil claims.
If there is a theory that would support this set of results, it escapes me. Of course,
of the six Justices in the Hallmajority, only Justice Stevens remains on the Court, and
the current ChiefJustice authored a sharp dissent in Hall; thus, perhaps that decision
will be the next victim of the seemingly relentiess expansion of state sovereign
immunity.
111 A Westlaw search, conducted on October 26, 1999, of the SCT database (which
extends back to 1945) for the terms ["Eleventh Amendment" and digniti] turned up
a number of private suits against states, all decided after 1992: Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct. 2240 (1999), Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), Seminole Tribe v.
Forida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30
(1994), and PuertoRico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf&Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139
(1993).
Only two other cases turned up by this search even mention protection of state
dignity in connection with state sovereign immunity. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at
416, the Court, in the course of rejecting a claim of sovereign immunity, stated that
any protection Nevada could claim against suit in a California court must emanate not
from the l1th Amendment but from "the voluntary decision of the second [state] to
respect the dignity of the first [state] as a matter of comity." In Petty v. Tennessee-
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accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in a federal
system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in both the
central Government and the separate States." 112 Ifideed, Alden depicts state dignity in more unqualified terms than state sovereignty:
the states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty."' 13
Appeals to dignity are somewhat evanescent; indeed, it is easy to
dismiss them out of hand by observing that states, unlike humans, lack
emotions and cannot suffer affronts."14 Perhaps, however, such a dismissal is a tad too quick. Article HI itself reflects, in its Original Jurisdiction Clause, a particular concern with suits to which states are
parties, by vesting original jurisdiction over them in a court of special
dignity-the Supreme Court of the United States. 1 5 Similarly, Congress, for roughly the first two-thirds of this century, maintained ajurisdictional structure that permitted only federal district courts of
special dignity-composed of three judges-to entertain actions seeking to enjoin state laws as unconstitutional."16 (Such actions were
nominally against state officers, but Congress saw through the
form."17 ) Still, neither of these jurisdictional recognitions of state digMissouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), the Court, in discussing the Chisholm
decision, quotes, in a footnote, a secondary source that describes the movement to
adopt the l1th Amendment as motivated by the desire "to prevent subsequent affronts to the dignity of states." Id. at 276 n.1 (quoting MARIAN DoRis IRISH &JAMES
WARREN PROTHRO, THE PoLmcs OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123 (1959)). This passing
reference was not of particular significance in Petty, where the Court ruled that the
states involved had waived any immunity by virtue of their entry into an interstate
compact; nothing in the waiver analysis turned on conceptions of state dignity.
112 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268; see also id. at 2263.
113 Id. at 2247 ( "[The Constitution] reserves to [the states] a substantial portion
of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes
inhering in that status.").
114 See Michael C. Doff, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61
(1998); Monaghan, supra note 16, at 132.
115 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article 11, 138 U. PA. L. REV.

1569, 1598 (1990).
116 The history is sketched in HART & WEcHSL='S THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra
note 66, at 1212-15.
117 For discussion of formal versus functional elements in the Court's federalism
decisions, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1995). For a broader, if even a bit overstated, critique of the Supreme Court's federalism decisions as formalistic, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalismand Functionalismin FederalismAnalysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1997).
Even the formal distinction between injunctions against state officers (permissible under Exparte Young 209 U.S. 123 (1908)) and damage actions against state treasuries (forbidden by Alden and Seminole Tribe) breaks down in practice. Injunctions,
as Owen Fiss noted, can be viewed as pinpointed obligations under the governing
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nity freed states from full compliance with federal law; instead, they
merely prevented state subjection to judicial orders by a single federal
judge.
The notion that respecting state dignity requires not merely regulating the forum but also restricting congressional power to authorize
private suit at all is, however, difficult to integrate with the American
constitutional tradition. Justice Souter's dissent noted that the dignitary concept is drawn from royal dignity'l"8-hardly a promising doctrinal source in a democratic republic based on sovereignty of the
people and subject to legal-constitutional constraints (including, incidentally, a prohibition on titles of nobility). 119 And more than a century ago, Justice Miller, in discussing the sovereign immunity of the
United States, dissected the dignitary rationale in language on which
it is hard to improve:
Nor can it be said that the government is degraded by appearing as
a defendant in the courts of its own creation, because it is constantly
appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its rights as
against the citizen to their judgment....
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects, are
the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or individual, are not
bound to give way to a sentiment of loyalty to the person of the
monarch. The citizen here knows no person, however near to those
in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need yield the
rights which the law secures to him when it is well administered.
When he, in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has established his right to property, there is no reason why deference to any
person, natural or artificial, not even the United States, should prevent him from using the means which the law gives him for the
1 20
protection and enforcement of that right.
More concretely, broad notions of state dignity are difficult to
square with accepted features of constitutional tradition. Foremost
among these are the power of another sovereign (the federal governconstitutional or statutory provisions. See OWEN M. Fiss, THE

CIVL RIGHTS INjucNrION

32-37, 68-74, 80-81 (1978). And the Court has held that violation of the pinpointed
obligations set forth in federal injunctions can lead to ajudicial levy against the public
fisc for contempt. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see also supra note 48.
Why state dignity requires immunity from general statutory duties (no matter how
clear) but not from pinpointed obligations as specified in a court order is never explained. Perhaps the Supreme Court is more concerned about adequate
enforcement of judicial directives (injunctions) than of congressional directives
(statutes).
118 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2271-73.
119 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
120 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206, 208-09 (1882).
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ment) to impose unwanted duties (like those of the FLSA) on the
states, and the power of that other sovereign to strip states of their

regulatory authority via federal preemption. State dignity is also compromised by all of the alternative means of judicial enforcement of
federal duties that the majority mentions as valid (perhaps most notably, by state subjection to injunctions entered nominally against state
officials), and by the manifold prohibitions and duties set forth in Article I Section 10, in Article IV, and in Amendments 13-15, 19, 24 and
26 to the Constitution.
If all of these burdens and accepted powers are consistent with
state dignity, what, exactly, is it about private damage actions that
grates? Perhaps it is the notion that if private parties can sue states for
damages, nothing is left of a conception of state sovereign immunity-much as the Court was concerned in Lopez that if the Gun Free
School Zones Act could be upheld, no statute could ever be found to
be outside of Congress's commerce power. 121 Whatever the merits of
Lope; the axiom that Congress has limited and enumerated powers is
well-entrenched in the Constitution's history and structure1 22 (though
of course the question whether or how courts should enforce those
limits today is highly contestable). By contrast, the notion that state
dignity demands some form of sovereign immunity from federal regulation falling within those enumerated powers is anything but
axiomatic.
The Court's paean to state dignity is accompanied by a similar
invocation of state sovereignty: "When a State asserts its immunity to
suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the States." 123 But as Jack Rakove has written, even under
the Articles of Confederation (much less under the Constitution), the
States were not "nation-states in the conventional sense, fully empow' 24
ered to confront the nations of Europe as equal sovereigns."'
Rakove elaborates,
From the start (that is, from the era of the American Revolution),
our practice and theory alike have made a hash of the traditional
concept of sovereignty that the colonists inherited from European
theorists. That traditional concept emphasized sovereignty's unitary
and absolute nature; ours parcels sovereignty out into bits and
pieces that are scattered throughout our system of governance, yet
121 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.
122 See, e.g., JAcK N. RAIovz, ORIGNAL MEAniwcs 57-93, 181-201 (1996).
123 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255-56.
124

Rakove, supranote 97, at 1043.
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somehow mystically reunited in the ineffable concept of an all-sover125
eign American people.
In fairness, Justice Kennedy could be viewed as conceding that
states are not fully sovereign. It is doubtful, however, that the idea of
126
sovereignty is useful in describing our constitutional federalism.
Consider how bizarre it would be to suggest that the sovereign nation
of France (1) may require the government of Great Britain to conform to French fair labor standards and bring suit (or authorize private injunctive actions against British officials) to enforce such laws, or
(2) may preempt Parliament's legislative authority over labor
standards.
In deploying conceptions of sovereignty, the critical vote in recent cases, and the greatest enigma, is Justice Kennedy. Of those in
the majority in Alden, only he also joined the majority in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,1 27 and thus, was in the majority in every major
federalism decision in recent years.' 2 8 Kathleen Sullivan has suggested that he alone sees both sides of constitutional federalismpreventing state interference with federal sovereignty while preventing federal authority from intruding on matters reserved to the
states.' 2

9

But that duality may result less from a coherent view of fed-

eralism than from an oscillation among inconsistent visions in succeeding cases. Thus, his conception of the relation of nation and
states in Alden seems quite different from his position several terms
ago in U.S. Term Limits. His concurrence there, while perhaps best
known for its vivid metaphor that "[t]he Framers split the atom of
sovereignty,"' 3 0 explicitly endorsed the transformative nationalism of
13
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland: '
125 Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, 2 GREEN BAG 35, 35 (1998).
126 See Rapaczynski, supra note 82, at 346-59.
127 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
128 The same five Justices joined the majorities in Lopez, Seminole Tribe, Alden,
Printz, and Gregory. Justice Souter added a sixth vote to the Gregory majority.
129 See Sullivan, supra note 117, at 103.
130 514 U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131 See id. at 840-41 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403
(1819)).
I refer to transformative nationalism as the view that while the Articles of Confederation were a traditional federation that preserved state sovereignty, the Constitution
represented a novel re-ordering of affairs, in which the sovereign people designed a
new national government that was supreme over the states but whose powers were
limited in important respects. That view can be seen as standing between two others.
A more purely nationalist view would stress that the separate colonies acted collectively through the Declaration of Independence and the Continental Congress and
suggest that neither before nor after Independence were the states fully sovereign in

2000]

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1043

The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected
by the state legislatures. But the instrument.

. .

wa submitted to

the people.... It is true, they assembled in-their several Statesand where else should they have assembled? No'political dreamer
was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which

separate the States, and of compounding the American people into
one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in
their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account,
cease to be the measures of the people themselves ....

132

Rejecting the view in Justice Thomas's U.S. Term Limits dissent that
popular consent was given by the people of each state separately, not
as an undifferentiated national populace,' 5 5 Justice Kennedy's concurthe classic sense-most notably in their lack of traditional authority over foreign affairs. See, e.g., SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERIcAN
FEDERAUSM

192-94, 235-36 (1993). A more state-oriented conception would con-

tend that the states not only became sovereign entities during Independence and
remained so during the Confederation period, but also that they preserved their
political sovereignty even when the Constitution was ratified, except insofar as they
delegated limited powers to the national govemment. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, 514
U.S. at 845-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
History rarely falls into neat models. As Jack Rakove suggests,
The deeper political reality underlying American constitutionalism was that

sovereignty was effectively divided-parceled out-from the origin of the
Republic(s). It did not leap the Atlantic in one fell swoop, to be partitioned
among thirteen sovereign states, or to be vested intact in the national government of the Continental Congress. Rather, Congress and the states
emerged simultaneously as effective institutions of government, each exercising powers that could be described as traditional marks of sovereignty,
each collaborating in supporting the other's authority, and each compelled
to place the imperatives of revolution above any concern about preserving
sovereignty in its virginal, unitary purity...
As the American colonies metamorphosed into states, they alone pos-

sessed the sovereign power to enact statutes, collect taxes, and maintain the
judicial systems that best defined the rights and duties of citizens. Yet in
matters of war and diplomacy-the traditional badges of sovereignty in its
international usage-the Continental Congress enjoyed an undisputed monopoly from its own inception in 1774. Significantly, too, when the time
came to replace the defunct colonial regimes and the extralegal apparatus of
revolutionary conventions with new legal governments, local authorities always solicited the approval of Congress before proceeding to draft the written charters that set American constitutionalism on its distinctive course. Yet
when Congress in turn began drafting articles of confederation to define its
own authority, its members recognized that whatever document they drafted
would require approval by the states.
Rakove, supra note 125, at 39 (emphasis in original).
132 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
133 See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

1044

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:3

rence affirmed, consistently with the U.S. Term Limits majority, that "it
is well settled that the whole people of the United States asserted their
political identity and unity of purpose when they created the federal
system" and that "the National Government ... owes its existence to
a 4
the act of the whole people who created it."1

Alden, by contrast, makes no reference to the sovereignty of the
people as a whole. Rather, Justice Kennedy begins with the dubious
assertion that states enjoyed sovereignty before the ratification, and
that except as altered by the Constitution, they retain their "residuary
and inviolable sovereignty." 35 His concern in U.S. Term Limits that
the national government, though limited in its objects, "is, and must
be, controlled by the people without collateral interference by the
States"' 3 6 seems to fall by the wayside in Alden, where he treats states
and the United States as being on a par:
It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own
courts. In light of our constitutional system recognizing the essential sovereignty of the States, we are reluctant to3 conclude
that the
7
States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.'
38
This notion of constitutional reciprocity is an odd one indeed.'
Contrast with it the following language from the Supreme Court:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the
policy of the state, and therefore that the courts of the state are free
to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes
what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the
exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted
that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and thereby
134 Id. at 838-39. Even commentators not unsympathetic to limits on national
authority have been skeptical of Justice Thomas's constitutional account. See, e.g.,
Charles Fried, Foreword:Revolutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (1995).
135 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247.
136 U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264. In P intz, too, the Court put forward this notion of
parity. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
138 States, after all, lack broad authority to regulate the federal government or
sometimes even its officials, see, e.g., Barrv. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), or to preempt
national legislative authority.
In considering the aptness of a notion of reciprocity with regard more specifically
to state and federal judiciaries, contrast the following well-established doctrines: (a)
Congress may limit the exercise of state court jurisdiction over federal causes of action by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, see generallyHART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS,

supranote 66, at 444-45, but (b) the states may not limit

the exercise of federal jurisdiction (e.g., jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship)
over state causes of action, see Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. 270 (1871).
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established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and
should be respected accordingly in the courts of the state.' 3 9
Those words were written by that well-known radical nationalist,
Justice Van Devanter.
Finally, invocations of state dignity and sovereignty are far harder
to maintain today than in 1789.140 In this regard, consider the
changes in the Supreme Court's view of the question whether a Governor may be obliged by federal law to extradite fugitives to another
state. In its 1860 decision in Kentucky v. Dennison,14 1 the Court interpreted the federal extradition statute to create only a moral duty, ruling that
the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to
impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel
him to perform it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and disable
him from performing his obligations to the State, and might impose
on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to
which he was elevated by the State.' 4 2
That decision was unanimously overruled in 1987 in Puerto Rico v.
43
where the Court found it to rest "upon a foundation with
Branstad,1
which time and the currents of constitutional change have dealt much
less favorably," and on a fundamental premise-"that the States and
the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns"-that is "fundamentally incompatible with more
than a century of constitutional development."' 4 4
Of course, Dennison's broad language may have been inspired by
the politics of slavery (extradition had been sought of a free black
charged with assisting the escape of a slave), and the decision came on
the eve of the Civil War, when, according to the Branstad Court, "the
practical power of the Federal Government [was] at its lowest ebb
139 Mondou v. NewYork, N.H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). To be sure, other
language in Mondou indicates that the case did not involve any attempt by Congress to
enlarge state court jurisdiction, but rather that federal law presupposed that state
courts already possessed such jurisdiction. See id. at 56.
140 Indeed, it is interesting how far the Alden majority succeeded-not completely,
but considerably-in inducing Justice Souter to debate the case on originalist
premises.
141 65 U.S. 66 (1860).
142 Id at 107-08 (emphasis added).
143 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
144 Id. at 227, 228, 230. Notably, Justices O'Connor and Powell dissociated themselves from these broad statements. See id. at 231.
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since the adoption of the Constitution."'145 Yet although slavery and
the Civil War are surely unique, the history of state sovereign immunity has also been influenced by the ebbs and flows of national power,
including the extent of federal courts' "practical power" to enforce
judgments against the states. 14 6 Today one hardly doubts that judicial
power (whether state or federal) is adequate to require Maine, if
found liable, to pay a judgment under the FLSA. (There is little reason to think that the practical capacity of federal courts to enforce
private judgments against the states when enforcing statutes enacted
under Article I is any less than their capacity to do so when enforcing
statutes enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-enforcement that sovereign immunity law still permits.)
More broadly, just as understandings of the federal commerce
power necessarily have expanded in the face of national economic integration and expanded federal regulation, so notions of state sovereignty cannot remain static given the dramatic growth in both state
governmental activity and in its intersection with that same federal
regulation. Multiple Congresses, in their exercise of Article I powers,
have indicated-with the clear statement that the Supreme Court now
demands-that proper regulation under a range of federal statutory
regimes calls for state damage liability.' 47 Those congressional deci145
146

Id. at 225.
See generallyJOHN V.

ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

(1987); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh

Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889

(1983).
147

The majority opinion in Alden states that the first example of such legislation

was the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) in 1908. SeeAlden, 119 S. Ct. at 2261.
In recent decades, as federal legislation has reached more widely and state activity has
expanded so as to intersect with federal regulatory concerns, statutes subjecting states
to suit have increased in number. They include (in addition to the FELA and the

FLSA) the laws protecting copyrights, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 (a), 511 (1994) (enacted by
Pub. L. No. 101-553, § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 2749, 2749-50 (1990)), trademarks, see 15
U.S.C. § 1122 (1994) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 102-542, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 3567, 3567-68

(1992)), and patents, see 35 U.S.C. § 296 (1994) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 102-560,
§ 2(a) (2), 106 Stat. 4230, 4230-31 (1992)); the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (Supp. III 1997) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 105-17, tit. I, § 101, 111
Stat. 37, 47 (1997)); the bankruptcy laws, see 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1996) (enacted by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 113, 108 Stat. 4106, 4117

(1994)); the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4) (a) (iii) (1994)
(enacted by Pub. L. No. 103-353, §2(a), 108 Stat. 3149, 3150 (1994)); the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2) (1994) (enacted by Pub. L. No.

10-3, tit. I, § 104, 107 Stat. 6, 15 (1993)); laws preventing discrimination on various
bases by recipients of federal funds, see The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,

Pub. L. No. 99-506, tit. X, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7
(1994)); laws providing for equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities, see 42
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sions have been made against a broader legal trend of restricting state
and federal immunity from suit148-treating sovereign immunity, in
the words of'Justice Frankfurter, as "an anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege" that "runs counter to democratic notions of the
moral responsibility of the State."' 4 9 In the face of all this, one has to
question the decision of sometime-textualists to impose a non-textual
limitation on federal legislative power that is based on a highly contestable vision of the original understanding' 50 and that has all of the
infirmities previously noted. So much for judicial restraint.
V. WHY Awmv?

How, then, can one understand the Court's current direction in
its federalism decisions? Despite the difficulties of seeking to explain
judicial behavior-whether of individual Justices or, in this case, of a
consistent majority of five-I will hazard a few suggestions.
One hypothesis would focus on the Court's perception of the
need to protect its own role in the constitutional scheme of separation
of powers-a hypothesis that links Alden to City of Boerne. In City of
Boerne, the Court viewed enactment of RFRA as an effort by Congress,
prompted by disagreement with the Court's rulings, to change the
contours of a constitutional right.151 The Court might similarly view
efforts by Congress to authorize private suit in state court as reflecting
a lack of respect for the Court's commitment to the Eleventh Amendment as a protection of state immunity from federal court suit. In
Seminole Tribe, the Court plainly expressed its view that a contrary
holding there, so as to permit Congress routinely to overcome immunity from federal court suit via statutory abrogation, would have made
immunity of little consequence. 152 Having thus fortified immunity
from federal court suit by making it invulnerable to abrogation by statU.S.C. § 12202 (1994) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. V, § 502, 104 Stat. 327, 340
(1990)); and the age discrimination in employment laws, see The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a) (2), 88 Stat. 55, 74 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994)).
148 See generally GEORGE C. CHRISu ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THlE LAW OF
TORTS 1330-31 (3d ed. 1997); HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS, supranote
66, at 1027-39; James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity:
FederalAppellate Court Reveiew of State CourtJudgmentsAfter Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 161, 205-07 & nn.166-69 (1998).
149 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
150 See generally Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
152 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64 ("If Hans means only that federal-question
suits for money damages against the States cannot be brought in federal court unless
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utes enacted under Article I, the Court may not have wanted Congress
to be able to make an end run around immunity by authorizing private suit in state court; hence Alden.' 5 s Insofar as Congress was seen
as promoting private suit against states, whether in federal or state
court, one might say here, as Michael McConnell said of the City of
Boerne decision, that the majority "viewed congressional action as an
1 54
irrelevance, if not an impertinence."'
Turning from institutional role to substantive commitment, one
can view Alden as part of a reaction by the Justices in the majority
against what they view as excessive and unjustified federal intervention
into matters that should be left to the states-a reaction not exclusively against regulation of "states qua states," but more broadly against
improvident uses of federal regulatory power that, even after Lopez,
remain within constitutional bounds. 155 The Court may well lament,
as I often do, that our current political climate assigns so little weight
to the tradition-proclaimed by Herbert Wechsler in 1954 as the most
important political safeguard of federalism-that federal intervention
is "exceptional" and must be justified by "some necessity."1 56 Indeed,
various of the decisions limiting national power have been characterized, by me and others, as a warning shot, or a form of cuing, to Con15 7
gress, meant to admonish it not to go "too far."
Congress clearly says so, it means nothing at all." (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 36 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
153 Of course, the Alden ruling created considerable tension with statements in
earlier opinions that the llth Amendment does not apply in state court-statements
whose fair implication was that the point disposed of any sovereign immunity issue.
See, e.g., Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 205 (1991); Maine

v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980); cf Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1979)
("[A] I1of these cases [concerning the scope of state sovereign immunity] concerned
questions of federa-courtjurisdiction .... These decisions do not answer the question whether the Constitution places any limit on the exercise of one's State's power

to authorize its courts to assert jurisdiction over another State."). For some of the
difficulties found in Alden's treatment of precedent, see HART & WEcHsLER's 1999
SUPPLEMENT, supra note *,at 135-36.
154 Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of

Boerne v. Flores, 111 HAv. L. REv. 153, 174 (1997).
155 For a similar suggestion, see Caminker, supra note 1, at 1001, 1007.
156 Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543, 544 (1954).
157 See PILIP BoBBrrr, CONsTrr ONAL FATE 190-95 (1982);Jenna Bednar &Wil-

liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory ofjudicialEnforcement of Federalism, 68 S.CAL.L. REV. 1447-50 (1995);Jackson, supra note 1, at 2227;
Meltzer, supranote 9, at 63; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramidsof Sacrifice?Problems of Federal-

ism in MandatingState Implementation of NationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1270 (1976); Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court OverruledNational League of Cities,
47 VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1652 (1994).
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But perhaps the Court thinks that Congress, to use a contemporary idiom, just doesn't get it, and hence some additional medicine is
needed to counteract congressional excesses. The medicine administered prior to Alden could be viewed as relatively mild. Lopez, as many
have noted,1 58 invalidated a pointless federal crime enacted for symbolic or political reasons, and set forth constitutional limits that Congress can usually satisfy with little loss of regulatory effectiveness-as
Congress illustrated when it rehabilitated the very statute invalidated
by Lopez by adding ajurisdictional element that will virtually always be
present. 15 9 New York v. United States and Printz raised fascinating
problems of constitutional theory, but the absence of a square precedent in either case suggests that the impact of those decisions may be
quite limited; 160 indeed, the Court rejected an expansive reading of
Printz this Term in Reno v. Condon.16 1 Perhaps, then, the Court in
Alden wanted to send a stronger message. To be sure, Alden, like
Printz or New York v. United States, did not hold a particular subject
matter (regulation under the commerce power of fair labor standards,
158 SeeJesse H. Choper, Did the Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States' Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court"?,46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 663-64 (1996); DeborahJones
Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 674, 692 (1995); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of
Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 643, 648 (1996); Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94
McH. L. REV. 533, 551-52 (1995); H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 651, 652 (1995).
159 The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104208, tit. I, § 101(f) (1996), forbids possession in a school zone of a firearm "that has
moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce." Most commentators have assumed that the amended statute falls comfortably within the Commerce
Clause even after Lopez, see, e.g., Steven D. Clymer, UnequalJustice: The Federalizationof
CriminalLaw, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 643, 662-64 (1997); Kit Kinports, Implied WaiverAfter
Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REV. 793, 822 n.119 (1998); Harry Litman & Mark D.
Greenberg, FederalPower and Federalism:A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of
TraditionallyState Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 930-31 (1997), and the statute's
constitutionality was upheld in a routine opinion in United States v. Danks, 187 F.3d
643 (8th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
160 See, e.g., Caminker, supranote 14, at 199-200;Jesse H. Choper, On the Difference
in Importance Between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the
Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19 CARIozo L. REV. 2259, 2269 (1998).
161 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). There, the Court unanimously reversed the Fourth Circuit, which had declared the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act unconstitutional
under both Printz and New York. In so ruling, the Supreme Court stressed that the
Act, while it regulates the states, does not require a state to either enact any laws
regulating private individuals or to assist in enforcing federal statutes regulating private individuals. See id. at 672. The Court did say that it did not need to address (and
thus could be viewed as having left open) the question whether a law lacking either of
these defects might nonetheless be void because it regulates the states exclusively; the
Act regulates private entities as well. See id. at 669-70.
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registration of handguns, or nuclear waste) to be outside congressional authority. But the enforcement technique that Alden invalidated, private suit against the states, is of far more general importance
to a broad range of federal programs than is "commandeering" of
state political officials. Indeed, while protesting in Alden that its decision really did not curtail federal enforcement power in any significant respect,162 perhaps the Court was not perturbed if, in fact, the
decision drew a little blood.
A distinct though consistent hypothesis is that some if not all of
the Justices in the majority lack sympathy for Garciaand do not trust
the political safeguards of federalism adequately to protect their vision
of state autonomy from direct federal regulation. Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor, the only Garcia dissenters still on the Court, both
pointedly predicted in their Garcia dissents that the majority's position there would in time be overruled.1 63 But even if five of today's
Justices would not, as a matter of first impression, have joined the Garcia opinion, they might hesitate to overrule it in a case like Alden.'64
For to have done so would have meant that in each of the last four
decades of this century, the Court would have shifted its position on
whether Congress may subject state and local governments to fair labor standards. Imagine this citation: Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled by Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999).165

A variation on this theme would begin with the same uncertainty
about whether five Justices remain sympathetic to Garcia, but would
focus on problems of constitutional implementation. 66 If the Garcia
majority is taken at face value, the Court there rejected the state autonomy approach of National League of Cities v. Usery' 67 in large part
because of the judiciary's inability to develop a doctrine whose application was relatively predictable and did not appear to be unduly re162
163

Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266-68.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1980)

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164
165

See supra note 28.
On the other hand, perhaps Alden could contribute to the Court's arguing,

some years from now, that Garciahas been sufficiently undercut by subsequent decisions that it can no longer be viewed as good law. Cf Yoo, supra note 28, at 1334-35
(declaring, before Alden, that Garciais not and should not be viewed as good law).
166 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. Ruv. 54 (1997).
167 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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suit-oriented. 168 Although that objection did not convince Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, it may resonate with other members of the
Alden majority insofar as they, though surely sympathetic to protection
of state autonomy, also believe in the importance of determinate doctrine. (Justice Scalia is the most obvious example. 169 ) But a decision
like Alden permits pursuit of the impulse to protect state autonomy
without the difficulties of NationalLeague of Cities, for the Court could
borrow the readily available Eleventh Amendment doctrine limiting
federal court power, and by applying it also in state courts, expand it
into a general immunity from private suit. Eleventh Amendment doctrine, to be sure, is replete with quirks, and, like most doctrines, has
considerable uncertainty at its margins, 170 but it is relatively determinative and has been richly elaborated in prior cases."71 Moreover, a
doctrine of state sovereign immunity from private suit can be viewed
as premised on less controversial limitations concerning legislative
technique rather than on judicial evaluation of the importance of legislative ends.
It is worth pausing to explore in more detail the implications of
this last hypothesis. Ordinarily, questions of substantive constitutional
law are thought of as of primary importance, while questions ofjurisdictional and remedial authority to enforce substantive constitutional
doctrines are secondary to, and indeed are shaped by, the substantive
constitutional doctrines. Thus, the central questions of constitutional
law would be the scope of national legislative authority (the issue in
Lopez) or the scope of a state's substantive immunity from national
168 See Garcia,469 U.S. at 533-39, 546-47. Mark Tushnet notes from his examination of the Court's internal records in the Brennan and Marshall papers thatJustice
Blackmun initially voted to invalidate the application of the FLSA to the governmental activity involved in Garcia, but after being assigned the opinion, he prepared a

draft reaching the opposite result-presumably because the opinion he expected to
draft would not write. See Tushnet, supra note 157, at 1627-28.
169

See generallyAntonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of

United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF
INTERP=rATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE

LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin

Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1185 (1989).
Of course, Justices Scalia and Kennedy did join Gregory v. Asheroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991), which endorses a doctrinal test, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that
may also be difficult to apply predictably. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
170 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 15, at 149; VWzquez, supra note 15, at 2-3.
171 Moreover, though I doubt that the historical materials go very far in supporting the Court's ultimate conclusion, without a doubt there were elements in the historical record-both from the Founding era and from the evolution of remedies in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-that resonate with the view that state
governments are immune from retrospective liability. See generallyWoolhandler, supra
note 76.
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regulation (the issue in National League of Cities and Garcia). That is
why I have described Lopez as a "narrow decision about a question of
great moment-the scope of congressional power to regulate," while
Alden, like Seminole Tribe, is "a broader decision about a question of
72
less significance.'
Thus, at least for as long as Lopez is quite a marginal limitation,
and Garcia's overruling of National League of Cities remains good law,
the Court's current regulation of constitutional federalism seems to
be leading with the tail rather than the dog: the Constitution does not
limit Congress's power to impose duties on the states under the FLSA,
but it does limit Congress's authority to provide the full range of remedies for those duties. Lacking a robust theory of what limits (or what
judicially enforceable limits) the Constitution places on congressional
regulatory authority, the Court directs its primary effort to limiting
the scope of remedies that Congress may deploy.
This approach to enforcing some conception of constitutional
federalism seems at once ineffectual and counterproductive. It is ineffectual because it leaves the states subject to FLSA regulation; indeed,
if states were to comply fully and in good faith with federal duties,
then the immunity recognized by Seminole Tribe and Alden would be
beside the point, for private suits seeking damages would never have
to be filed. The inadequacy of Alden to promote any robust conception of state sovereignty underlies Charles Fried's vivid description of
173
Alden as "like using a screwdriver to pound nails."
However, in order to evoke more clearly the damage that Alden
may cause to the enforcement of legitimate and important federal
objectives, one could equally well invert Fried's image, and describe
the decision as "like using a hammer to drive screws." For Alden is a
rule of enormous generality, applicable apparently to all exercises of
national legislative authority under Article I, not merely to those that
seem marginal or overreaching. Federal regulation under relatively
more specific grants of regulatory power-to enact uniform rules regarding bankruptcy, or to create exclusive rights in "Writings and Discoveries"-are now limited by state immunity, as is legislation that no
one would think near the outer reaches of the commerce power (e.g.,
the regulation of state-owned railroads operating in interstate commerce). Because, as noted earlier, retrospective liability may be an
important regulatory tool, the Court's recognition of a general immu-

172
173

Meltzer, supra note 9, at 63.
Charles Fried, Supreme Court Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1999, at A17.
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nity from private suit in both federal and state court may have significant consequences for regulatory effectiveness. 174
That Alden is at once ineffectual in protecting state interests and
harmful to achievement of legitimate national objectives may explain
differing reactions to it. Focusing on the first point, some have argued that Alden is a decision of only marginal significance. Thus, for
example, Kathleen Sullivan wrote shortly after this Term's immunity
decisions that criticism of them was "hyperbolic" and stated that "the
striking feature of these rulings is how little they challenged the federal government's substantive power to make labor, patent and trademark law.' 75 She stated, quite accurately, that "[t]hese decisions
were not about whether Congress may regulate the states in these areas but rather how it may enforce such regulation," but with a clear
implication that the latter question is of greatly subordinate importance. 176 But those who, like me, are more inclined to think that Alden has greater significance, focus less on its leaving substantive
regulatory ruling intact and more on its potential to impair effective
enforcement of the substantive power that the federal government retains. 17 7 To be sure, given the lack of a longstanding history of federal
174 See supra Part I.
175 Kathleen M. Sullivan, FederalPower, Undimmed, N.Y. TIMES,June 27, 1999, § 4,
at 17.
176 Id.; see also Rapaczynski, supranote 82, at 346 n.21 (dismissing sovereign immunity as largely irrelevant to federalism because states are not immune from suit by

other states or the United States-with little attention to the effectiveness of such suits
in enforcing legal regimes).
Mark Tushnet echoes this perspective and offers the related argument that "less-

than-maximally effective remedies are not strangers even to constitutional law," pointing to cases limiting the reach of Bivens remedies or extending qualified immunity

from damages in constitutional tort actions against officials. Tushnet, supra note 52,
at 73 n.212. The point is surely correct, but overlooks the difference between

remedies ordered by courts on their own (or when enforcing broadly worded enactments like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)) and remedies whose provision is specifically directed by federal legislation; constitutional foreclosure of the latter is a far more

serious matter.
177 A sociologist of the legal academy might wonder whether differing perspectives
on the significance of a decision like Alden may be partially explained by the conventional division of constitutional law topics in law school curricula. In general, the
bulk of federalism-related matters-for example, the reach of the commerce power
(as well as its dormant preemptive effect); the existence vel non of constitutionally

protected areas of state autonomy from federal regulation; and the scope of legislative
power under the Reconstruction amendments-are discussed in the basic constitutional law course. Other topics that bear importantly on the enforcement of constitutional rights-sovereign immunity, constitutional remedies, congressional control of

federal courtjurisdiction, and remedial authority-are typically considered in federal
courts or civil rights courses. Dean Sullivan is a teacher of constitutional law but not
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imposition of retrospective liability on state governments, there is
something to the claim that the constitutional preclusion of such liability cannot be treated as a serious truncation of necessary federal
authority.178 Yet "experience for much of that time, when both federal regulatory power and state governmental activity were far more
constricted, may not be highly pertinent to today's problems";179 the
intersection of the application of federal patent laws to the states and
recent growth in the development of patentable products by state universities is just one example of that phenomenon. Surely Congress,
which one would ordinarily take to be better equipped than the Court
to determine what means of enforcement are important, has repeatedly taken a view in recent years that retrospective state liability should
be an available remedy under a variety of federal statutes. 80
The tail-wagging-the-dog quality of the Court's interventions regarding constitutional federalism makes me think that the current
doctrinal pattern is not a stable one. The Court may decide to extend
Lopez or resurrect NationalLeague of Cities or otherwise recognize substantive limits on Congress's regulatory authority. Or perhaps, to offer a more hopeful vista, a future Court will take the view that Seminole
Tribe and Alden were misguided and will overrule their limitation of
congressional power.
VI.

ABROGATION UNDER SEGrION

5: THE _FORIDvA PizEPADZ)

DECISION

The Court's companion decision in Florida PrepaidPostsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank' 8 ' exhibits a similarly
of federal courts. By contrast, as a federal courts teacher who does not teach the
standard constitutional law course, perhaps I am predisposed "to doubt that 'the central problems for constitutional law.., are issues of the definition of rights rather
than the creation of a machinery of jurisdiction and remedies that can transform
rights proclaimed on paper into practical protections.'" Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private
Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 282 (1988) (quoting Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,
Juries,Jurisdiction,and Race Discrimination:The Lost Promise ofStrauder v. West Virginia,
61 TEx. L. REV. 1401, 1413 (1983)). Attention to the available machinery in statutory
cases like Alden, it should go without saying, is of equal importance.
As put, the point is plainly too crude: some constitutional law teachers lament
Alden, while some federal courts teachers think it correct; and quite a few law professors confound any simple distinction by teaching both subjects. But nonetheless it
seems possible that the differing perspectives of the different courses may account for
some of the variation in reactions to Alden.
178 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 47.
179 See id. (discussing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71-72).
180 See supra note 147.
181 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
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constricted judicial willingness to defer to Congress in matters of constitutional federalism. The issue there was the validity of the "Patent
and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act," 182 through
which Congress, in 1992, had purported to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and thus to subject them to private damage actions in federal court for patent infringement. The validity of
the abrogation depended on the source of legislative authority behind
it: if authorized only by the Patent Clause of Article I, the effort to
abrogate was doomed under Seminole Tribe; but if authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act was, under the Court's
decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,183 a valid exercise of congressional
power. Given that somewhat odd doctrinal structure, recognition of
broad power in Congress to legislate under Section 5 might seem, at
least to devotees of state sovereign immunity, to permit an end run
184
around the Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe.
From this perspective, it was no great surprise that the five Justices in the Alden majority again joined together in FloridaPrepaidto
hold that the Patent Remedy Act could not be upheld under Section 5
as a measure to enforce the right of patent holders not to be deprived
of their intellectual property without due process of law. In Florida
Prepaid, the Court purported to apply the framework of its decision
two years earlier in City of Boerne, a case not involving state sovereign
immunity, which had decided far broader questions about the scope
of congressional authority under Section 5. This Essay is not the occasion to evaluate the Court's approach in City of Boerne.'8 5 What is
182

Pub. L. No. 102-560, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 4230, 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C.

§§ 271(h), 296 (1994)).
183 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
184 Concern to that effect had been expressed directly by lower courts. See, e.g.,
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that to
permit an action against a state for copyright infringement under Section 5 would be
"a direct end-run around Seminole's holding that Article I powers may not be employed to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's limit on the federal judicial power"), vacated and remanded, 180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam).
185 For varying defenses of this decision, see, for example, Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, CongressionalPower and Religious Liberty After City of
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 79, Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and
ComparativeConstitutionalism:OpeningUp the Conversationon "Proportionality,"Rightsand
Federalism, 1 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 583 (1999), and William W. Van Alstyne, TheFailureof
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, 46 DUKE
L.J. 291 (1996).
For criticism, see, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HAmv. L.
REV. 747, 818-27 (1999), David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v.
Flores and CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 31, and
McConnell, supra note 154.
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noteworthy about FloridaPrepaid,however, is that the Court's application of the City of Boerne framework was at once cavalier and highly
restrictive, leading one to surmise that the majority's powerful commitment to the proposition that states should not be suable at the
behest of private parties may shape its application of related constitutional doctrines.
In FloridaPrepaid, the Court began by considering the scope of
the constitutional right that the Patent Remedy Act could be viewed as
redressing. The majority advanced two reasons why a state that infringes a private patent may not have deprived the patent holder of
property without due process, and, therefore, why the Patent Remedy
Act extended well beyond enforcing the patent holder's due process
right. First, the Court doubted the existence of a deprivation. Writing
for the Court, the Chief Justice contrasted the Court's due process
precedents-which hold that no deprivationresults from merely negligent action of state officials-with the patent laws, which authorize
infringement actions against (inter alia) the states even where the infringement was entirely inadvertent.18 6 But as the dissenters noted
without contradiction, the patent holder's complaint alleged a willful
violation of the patent laws,' 8 7 an adequate basis (at the pleading
stage) for establishing that, as applied to the case at hand, 18 8 the Patent Remedy Act was redressing a deprivation of property. 8 9
186 See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS
§ 16.02 (2), at 16-31 (rev. ed. 1998) ("It is, of course, elementary that an infringement
may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the
patent.")).
187 See id. at 2213 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188 On the preference for as-applied adjudication, see, for example, United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987), Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504
(1985), and Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217,
219-20 (1912).
189 Moreover, the precise meaning of the requirement of intentional conduct in
the patent context is difficult to discern because of the Court's failure to apply it to
the facts of the case. The requirement originated in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986), where a prisoner claimed that he injured himself after tripping over a pillow
negligently left on a staircase by a prison official. Quite different from that situation
was the one alleged in F/orida Prepaid-thata state agency was engaged in systematic
marketing of a product that infringed the plaintiff's patent. Surely the conduct of the
responsible state officials in developing and marketing the product in question was
intentional, as was any resulting harm to (diversion of business from) the plaintiff. It
would hardly seem necessary, in order to be faithful to Daniels's evident concern with
avoiding the constitutionalization of isolated instances of official negligence, to require a further showing that the responsible state officials knew (a) that the plaintiff
held the patent in question, (b) that the patent was valid, or (c) that the state's use
was an infringing one.
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The Justices comprising the majority in FloridaPrepaidhave been
those most insistent on judging the constitutionality of statutes on an
as-applied rather than a facial basis. 190 Consequently, their failure
even to articulate any argument for departing from their own preferred practice of as-applied adjudication is puzzling. 19 1 But perhaps
190 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1867-70 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ. & Scalia, J.); Janklow v.
Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175-76 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. &
Thomas, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari to Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d
1452 (8th Cir. 1995)); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514
(1990) (Kennedy, J., joined, inter alia, by Rehnquist, CJ. & O'Connor & Scalia, JJ.)
(stating that "[t]he Court of Appeals should not have invalidated the Ohio statute on
a facial challenge based upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur"); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ.,joined, inter alia,by O'Connor
& Scalia, JJ.).
191 My colleague Dick Fallon, while in the end critical of the Court's facial invalidation of the Patent Remedy Act, has suggested a possible explanation therefor. In
his view, (a) the appropriateness of facial challenges depends upon the nature of the
constitutional infirmity in the statute, as some infirmities (e.g., unconstitutional purpose) may infect a statute in its entirety, and (b) the defect in Florida Prepaidmight
plausibly be viewed as a failure by Congress adequately to deliberate about and to
articulate legislative findings concerning, the need for the legislation as a means of
enforcing the Constitution-a failure that infected the entire statute. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and FacialChallenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv.
(forthcoming Apr. 2000). Of course, as Fallon recognizes, the observation that some
constitutional defects may infect any conceivable statutory application does not necessarily require facial invalidation-that is, a judicial order enjoining every application
of the statute. Rather, it ordinarily would suffice for the court to invalidate the statute
as applied to particular litigants, albeit on a theory whose implication is that no other
application of the statute would be constitutional. In practice the two approaches are
unlikely to vary significantly unless a second court not bound by the prior ruling were
to disagree with it. The key question, then, is whether the applicable test under City of
Boerne concerns a defect in congressional process.
The recent decision in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000),
suggests that the initial inquiry under City of Boerne is one of proportionality, which
considers whether a substantial percentage of cases to which a statute applies involve
conduct that also would violate the 14th Amendment. See id. at 644-45. The Court
added, however, that the fact
[tihat [a statute] prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional, while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our Section 5
inquiry. Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,
and we have never held that Section 5 precludes Congress from enacting
reasonably prophylactic legislation.... One means by which we have made
such a determination in the past is by examining the legislative record conmining the reasons for Congress' action.
Id. at 648. It thus appears that any process concern under City of Boerne is secondary,
arising only after a finding that an insufficient proportion of conduct reached by a
statute is also unconstitutional.
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in deciding whether to engage in facial or in as-applied adjudication,
the key factor is the depth of the Court's commitment to the underlying constitutional value. Much as the Warren Court permitted First
Amendment facial attacks in part because of its view of the singular
importance of free expression, the Rehnquist Court may permit facial
challenges to statutes as outside the enumerated powers of Congress
in part because of its view of the importance of constitutional federalism, or, more specifically, of state sovereign immunity.19 2 If that is so,
it would only highlight the distance the Court has moved from the
theory of Garcia: not only is federalism now to be enforced in the
judicial rather than the political process, but enforcement is to be implemented through an especially aggressive adjudicatory technique.
There remains, however, a question about how this primary standard of proportionality is capable of as applied adjudication. In individual rights litigation, a litigant
whose conduct is constitutionally protected may, without more, have a statute declared invalid as applied to his conduct. By contrast, a state, when contending that a
measure falls outside of Section 5, does not prevail simply by showing that the particular conduct at issue is not independently unconstitutional; the constitutional question
in the particular case depends upon consideration of the general reach of the statute
as compared to the reach of the self-executing Constitution. Still, merely because the
proportionality test by its nature compares two classes of conduct does not preclude
as applied adjudication. For example, even were the Patent Remedy Act to be
deemed unconstitutional, because disproportionate, if applied to all state patent infringement whether or not intentional, the Court could have ruled that at least as
applied to a narrower set of conduct (for example, intentional state infringements)
the Patent Remedy Act was not disproportionate and thus could be constitutionally be
applied on this narrower basis. And had the Court followed that approach, it appears
that there would have been no occasion to consider any possible "process" defect in
the Act.
Other arguments for permitting facial attacks in some cases might be based upon
(a) the unavailability of a determinate rule to delineate the narrowed scope for valid
statutory application, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 1; cf.
Note, The First Amendment OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970); or (b)
relatedly, whether such excision can easily be imposed or instead would burden the
courts by requiring a very large number of as-applied attacks in order clearly and fully
to remove constitutional defects, cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 376-78 (1964)
(refusing to abstain in a vagueness challenge where it was "fictional to believe that
anything less than extensive adjudications, under the impact of a variety of factual
situations, would bring the oath within the bounds of permissible constitutional certainty"). However, a simple holding that the Patent Remedy Act could be applied to
intentional (and perhaps reckless) conduct but not to negligent or faultless conduct
would have been more than adequately determinate. Cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that common law liability for defamation of public
figures could be enforced only when the defendant acted with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the truth, even though state defamation doctrine did not itself impose that scienter requirement).
192 See Fallon, supra note 191.
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But all of this is speculation, for the majority offers no explanation of,
much less justification for, its facial invalidation of the Patent Remedy
Act.
The Court's second reason for finding that state patent infringement may not violate the Due Process Clause is equally problematic.
Relying on the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor'9 3 and Zinermon v.
Burch,19 4 the Court held that a state's patent infringement, even if a
deprivation, would not necessarily constitute a deprivation without due
process. The Parrattand Zinermon decisions ruled that when a deprivation of liberty or property is random and unauthorized, the only process due is a meaningful post-deprivation remedy (for example, a tort
action against the state or the responsible officials); thus, a procedural
due process violation comes into being only when the state fails to
provide such a post-deprivation remedy. But the Patent Remedy Act,
the Supreme Court reasoned, by authorizing a federal patent infringement remedy without regard to the existence of a state post-deprivation remedy, extends to circumstances in which the state has
committed no constitutional violation.
Here, too, however, the FloridaPrepaidCourt paid no attention to
whether the Patent Remedy Act was constitutional as applied to the
facts in the case. For under the Parratt[Zinermondoctrine, the Act
would reach beyond the Due Process Clause only if (a) the alleged
deprivation by the State of Florida was random and unauthorized' 9 5
and (b) Florida in fact provided meaningful post-deprivation redress
under state law. The Court did not inquire whether either, much less
96
both, of these conditions obtained.
193 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
194 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
195

On that point, the facts in F/ohida Prepaidwere very different from those of

Parrattand its progeny, which were one-shot instances of unlawful conduct by individual state officers. In florida Prepaidthe state was continuously involved in the marketing of a product that it knew the plaintiff claimed to be an infringement of the

plaintiff's patent. On those facts, the plaintiff patent holder might well have been
able to establish that, in the words of the Zinermon decision, it "seeks to hold state

officials accountable for their abuse of their broadly delegated, uncircumscribed
power to effect the deprivation at issue." Zinemnon, 494 U.S. at 136.
196 Moreover, the idea that patent infringement issues should be determined in
state courts under state post-deprivation remedies is itself troubling for a different
reason. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, see Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2212-13, Congress has long determined that claims arising under the patent laws should be within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, which are more expert than state
courts and better able to promote much-needed uniformity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(1994). For much the same reasons, but far more exceptionally, Congress has consolidated appeals in patent cases in a single circuit-the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. See id. § 1295. Yet the f/oridaPrepaidopinion wreaks havoc with this system in
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Quite apart from the Court's departure from as-applied adjudication, the ForidaPrepaid opinion seems to hurdle past difficult questions in invalidating the Patent Remedy Act's purported abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. The Zinermon opinion had clearly stated (in
dictum but without dissent on this point) that the existence of postdeprivation remedies is relevant only to procedural and not to substantive due process claims. 197 That limitation is not merely a technical point of doctrine, but a critically important understanding of the
reach of federal constitutional protection. Three-quarters of a cen98
tury earlier, in Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles,'
the Supreme Court affirmed that the Constitution protects individuals
against action by a state official-even if that action was not authorized by or contrary to the policy of the state, and whether or not the
state courts would stand ready to provide redress for the official's violation of state law. The Parratt-Zinermonrule is a limited exception
to that fundamental proposition, one that, to date, the Court has
confined to procedural due process violations that are random and
unauthorized. 9 9 It is not an easy question whether, under the
Court's precedents, a state's deprivation of intellectual property
rights via infringement of a patent is better viewed under the rubric
of substantive due process-as an interference with property rights
that is complete when effected-or under the rubric of procedural due process-in which case a post-deprivation remedy is, at
least in some circumstances, all the process that is due.2 0 0 Here
those cases in which the alleged patent infringer is a state government: for even when
an alleged infringement might violate constitutionally protected property rights, on
the Court's theory the only remedy (at least in states that do provide post-deprivation
remedies) is for patent holders to file suit in state trial courts and to proceed though
the state court system, with virtually no chance of obtaining federal review.
197 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124-27.
198 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
199 A second exception to the general rule of Home Telephone is found in the rule,
long pre-dating Parrattand Zinermon, that under the Just Compensation Clause a taking of property by a state official without authorization does not give the property
holder a right to compensation from the state, but instead only to remedies against
the official. See infra note 205. It is a question worthy of further study how that doctrine and the rule of Home Telephone came to co-exist.
200 For some discussion of this question from quite different frameworks, see
Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutionalin Light of Seminole Tribe ?, 67 FoRDRAm L. REV. 1435, 1503-08 (1999), Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some
Confusions About Due Process,JudicialReview, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L.

REV. 309 (1993), and PaulJ. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remediesfor the Misappropriation
of Intellectual Property by State and MunicipalGovernments Before and After Seminole Tribe:
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849,
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too, however, the Court's opinion fails even to advert to the ques2 01
tion.
In one last respect, the Court's opinion is open to criticism-for
its failure to give Congress the "wide latitude" promised by the City of
Boerne opinion "in determining where [the line]" lies "between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures
that make a substantive change in the governing law." 20 2 In invalidat-

ing RFRA, the City of Boerne Court noted that while only those generally applicable state laws enacted because of religious bigotry violate
the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA had subjected all state laws to a form
of statutory strict scrutiny--and had done so without legislative findings that unconstitutional motivation was commonly present. 20 3 In
FoidaPrepaid,the Court similarly questioned the means/ends fit, objecting that Congress, when enacting the Patent Remedy Act, had
identified no pattern of patent infringement (much less of constitutional violations) by the states. The analogy to City of Boerne, however,
was misplaced. There, the ratioof constitutional violations to statutory
applications was, in the Court's view, inordinately low. But under the
Patent Remedy Act-assuming that its application were limited to in20 4
tentional patent infringements that are deprivations of property,
900-01 (1998). My own view is that the entire set of cases has mischaracterized in
procedural due process terms what should be viewed as substantive harms, and that
the critical question should be whether the substantive harm is the kind of injury
against which the Constitution provides protection. For an elaboration of a similar
view, see, for example, Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and
the Scope of ConstitutionalTorts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201 (1984).
201 Moreover, as VickiJackson has pointed out, the evident purpose of the ParrattZinermon doctrine was to avoid federalizing routine state law actions when the
tortfeasor happens to be someone acting under color of state law-hardly a concern
in the patent area, which long has been the exclusive domain of the national government. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the Denationalizationof Federal Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
202 City of Boern, 521 U.S. at 519-520. Note in the companion decision in College
Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondayEducation Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. 2219
(1999), an offhand comment by the Court described the scope of power under Section 5 in terms far narrower than those used in City of Boerne. After having found that
the state conduct at issue did not constitute a deprivation of property, the Court said,
[W]e need not pursue the follow-on question that City of Boernewould otherwise require us to resolve: whether the prophylactic measure taken under
purported authority of Section 5 (viz., prohibition of States' sovereign-immunity claims, which are not in themselves a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment) was genuinely necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 2225 (emphasis added).
203 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
204 See supra note 191.
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and that at least a good number of those deprivations will be without
due process of law-the ratio of such instances of patent infringement
to the number of constitutional violations will be relatively high. Perhaps the absolute numbers of both will be small if, as the Court suggested, patent infringement by states is not a large problem. But
whether the absolute number of state infringements is large or small,
the ratio of statutory violations to constitutional violations will be the
same. Thus, even if the Court was correct in suggesting that patent
infringement by states is infrequent, nothing in City of Boerne, or elsewhere in the Constitution, bars Congress from enacting limited statutes to address limited problems.
Thus, the Court's analysis in FloridaPrepaidof the constitutionality of the Patent Remedy Act suffered from a multitude of difficulties.
Those difficulties might be the product of end of the Term pressures,
but more likely they arose from a determination to announce a ruling
that the Act was invalid in toto, so as to preserve the principle of state
sovereign immunity.20 5 My own view, which I have explained else205 See HART & WECHSLER 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note *, at 105. The Court did
not consider a distinct argument for upholding the Patent Remedy Act-that it was a
valid exercise of power under Section 5 to enforce the constitutional protection
against takings of property without just compensation. Noting that neither the text
nor the committee reports suggested that Congress had in mind the Just Compensation Clause, the Court took the view that Congress's explicit reliance on its (purported) authority under Article I and its authority under Section 5 to enforce the due
process right "preclude [d] consideration of the Just Compensation Clause as a basis
for the Patent Remedy Act." Horida Prepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7.
That refusal was somewhat extraordinary, though not entirely unprecedented.
For example, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court invalidated sections 1-2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as falling outside the scope of the congressional authority under the enforcement clauses of the 13th and 14th Amendments.
In so ruling, the Court refused to consider whether those provisions, in at least certain applications, might be justified as a valid exercise of the commerce power, reasoning that the provisions "in question are not conceived in any such view." Id. at 19.
The dissent objected in turn: "Has it ever been held that the judiciary should overturn
a statute, because the legislative department did not accurately recite therein the particular provision of the Constitution authorizing its enactment?" Id. at 60 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
More recent authority, however, suggests, that no such recitation is necessary. In
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Court stated that the constitutionality of a
federal statute does not depend on whether Congress recited the particular source of
legislative authority under which the statute might be upheld. Id. at 243-44 n.18
(quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)). The statement was
strictly dictum, as the Court there upheld the ADEA under the commerce power, on
which Congress had explicitly relied. However, both the majority opinion and the
ChiefJustice's dissent appeared to agree that Congress, in extending that act to state
and local governmental employers, had not expressly relied upon any purported au-
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where,20 6 is that the entire structure of abrogation doctrine-permitting congressional abrogation under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments but not under Article I-makes little sense. But that
structure seems for the moment well-entrenched, and more litigation
as to the scope of legislative authority under Section 5 will be required
to determine whether existing efforts by Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity are constitutionally valid.2 0 7 Already one

more decision in this line has been handed down, holding that Congress lacks power under Section 5 to abrogate state immunity from
suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.20 8 Although
thority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. See id, at 243-44 n.18; id. at 251-52
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). And in its recent decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), the Court did proceed to rule on whether that same act,
as applied to state employers, could be upheld as an exercise of congressional power
under Section 5-without suggesting any disagreement with the view that Congress
had not purported to rely on that source of legislative authority in enacting the
ADEA.
With regard to the Patent Remedy Act, given that Congress made clear its intention both to regulate the states and to rely on both Article I and Section 5 powers in
doing so, it is difficult to see what purpose would be served by refusing to consider
whether the Act might be justified as a measure enforcing the Just Compensation
rather than the Due Process Clause.
In the end, however, given the Court's approach to tlke due process argument in
FloridaPrepaid,it is doubtful that a Section 5 argument based on the Just Compensation Clause would have prevailed. First, it appears to be well accepted under the Just
Compensation Clause that government action that is ultra vires is not a taking. See
generally Matthew D. Zinn, Note, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MIcH. L. REV. 245 (1998). This
understanding presents a particular problem if, as some have argued, federal intellectual property laws preempt authority states would otherwise have to condemn, and
pay just compensation for, intellectual property rights. See Bohannan & Cotter, supra
note 200, at 1459-69. On that view, because states by definition lack authority to take
intellectual property rights, any infringement by officials is unauthorized. Whatever
the correct view on the preemption issue, insofar as state officials who were infringing
patents were doing so without state authorization, their conduct would not give rise to
a right to just compensation and thus, under the approach of F/orida Prepaid,the
Patent Remedy Act would be constitutionally suspect as sweeping more broadly than
does the Constitution.
Relatedly, even where a taking is not ultra vires, a claim for just compensation
ordinarily is not ripe until the claimant has sought compensation under state law. See
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
Insofar as states do offer compensation for takings of intellectual property rights, then
under the analysis of FloridaPrepaid the Patent Remedy Act would, for a second reason, reach far beyond the scope of the Just Compensation Clause.
206 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 20-24.
207 See id. at 47-50.
208 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), affirming Kimel v. State
Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998). This Term, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in two cases raising the question whether Congress has constitu-
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that decision seems to be a straightforward application of the framework of City ofBoerne, 20 9 one may still fear that pronouncements about
the reach of Section 5 may be shaped by the Court's wish to prevent
congressional "evasions" of sovereign immunity and may unduly restrict legislative authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
And any restrictions that result will, of course, have ripple effects in
cases having nothing to do with sovereign immunity.
VII.

CONCLUSION

It remains to be seen whether Congress will continue to try to
find new means, consistent with the most recent Supreme Court pronouncements, to make states subject to private suits seeking damages
for violations of federal law. While Alden closed off what might have
been one means to achieve that objective (suit in state court), and
FloridaPrepaidlimited a second (abrogation of immunity by legislation
enacted under Section 5), Congress has other possible techniques at
hand: to condition federal spending,210 or perhaps the failure to preempt state power, on state waivers of immunity, or to authorize qui
tam actions on the theory that they fall under the protective umbrella
of suits by the United States. While none of the opinions in the three
sovereign immunity decisions is very illuminating as to the pre-existing uncertainties about the scope or validity of these techniques,
some language could be viewed as signaling that some of these mechanisms may also be limited if not sacrificed at the altar of state sover21 1
eign immunity.
tional power to abrogate the states' 11th Amendment immunity from suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, but certiorari was dismissed in both cases. See Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 120 S. Ct. 1003, cert. dismissed, No. 99-423, 2000 WL 230234 (U.S.
Mar. 1, 2000); Florida Dep't of Corrections v. Dickson, 120 S. Ct. 976, cert. dismissed,
No. 98-829, 2000 WL 215674 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2000).
209 The dissenters made no effort to argue that the ADEA was a valid exercise of
legislative authority under Section 5; instead, they took issue with the holding of Seminole Tibe that Congress lacks power, when legislating under Article I, to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. See 120 S. Ct. at 650-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 See Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999).
211 The Court's language in Alden concerning conditional spending is entirely
unilluminating: "Nor, subject to constitutional limitations, does the Federal Government lack the authority or means to seek the States' voluntary consent to private
suits." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
The discussion of suits by the United States could be viewed as ominous with
regard to the qui tam issue:
[A] suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of
the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, differs in
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Already this Term, the Court has ruled that Congress lacks power
to abrogate immunity from suit alleging age discrimination,2 1 2 and
has granted certiorari in two cases to decide a similar question as to
suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but certiorari was dismissed in both cases.215 Also pending is a case in which the Court
could decide whether states enjoy sovereign immunity from qui tam

kind from the suit of an individual: While the Constitution contemplates
suits among the members of the federal system as an alternative to extralegal
measures, the fear of private suits against nonconsenting States was the central reason given by the founders who chose to preserve the States' sovereign
immunity. Suits brought by the United States itself require the exercise of political responsibilityfor each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent
from a broad delegation to privatepersons to sue nonconsenting States.
Id. (emphasis added). For a powerful argument that sovereign immunity does not
shield states from qui tam actions, see Caminker, supra note 56.
As for conditional preemption-that is, legislation providing that state activity in
a particular area will be preempted unless the state waives sovereign immunity-the
holding in the companion decision in College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaty EducationExpense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), may cast some doubt upon the
constitutionality of at least some uses of that legislative technique. The Court there
ruled that Florida had not waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in federallyregulated for profit activity in the face of a federal statute clearly providing that such
activity would subject the state to suit. In expressly rejecting any notion of constructive waiver of immunity, the Court distinguished holdings permitting Congress to require a state to waive its immunity as a condition of obtaining federal funds or federal
approval of an interstate compact. Those holdings, the Court ruled in College Savings
Bank, involved congressional grants of gratuities (spending or approval of compacts);
by contrast, exclusion of a state from otherwise permissible activity, the Court stated,
is not a gratuity but a sancion. See id. at 2231. Preemption, needless to say, is precisely exclusion of a state from otherwise permissible activity.
Of course, there is a baseline problem here that the Court failed to acknowledge.
Suppose that Congress had in an initial enactment unconditionally preempted states
from operating railroads that engage in or affect interstate commerce. If Congress
were thereafter, in a second enactment, to offer the states the opportunity to have
that prohibition lifted, so as to permit them to operate railroads, on the condition
that states waive immunity, that offer would expand the states' options as compared to
the baseline of the prior unconditional preemption of state authority. Thus, it would
be hard to view the second enactment as imposing a sanction. Yet it is difficult to
believe that the constitutionality of a statutory scheme that preempts state authority
unless the state waives immunity should depend on whether the congressional action
was taken all at once (in which case the state could be viewed as excluded from otherwise permissible activity) or in two steps (in which case the state could be viewed as
permitted, conditionally, to engage in what would otherwise be impermissible).
212 See Kime4 120 S. Ct. at 643.
213 See Alsbrook, 120 S. Ct. at 1003; Dickson, 120 S. Ct. at 976.
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actions, 2 14 as well as a different case raising the question whether the
Violence Against Women Act falls within the scope of the commerce
power.21 5 I suspect that national power may be trimmed back still further by the Term's end.
Judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on national power, it
has been argued, has value in part because it may shape the political
process: Supreme Court decisions attract Congress's attention, while
providing another set of arguments that states can raise in the political forum.2 1 6 One need not quarrel with that view to note that everything depends on what the limit is. One cannot take as a premise that
there must be some judicially enforceable limit,2 1 7 no matter how artificial or unresponsive to the underlying federalism concerns, or how
plainly at odds with the prevailing will of the political branches, any
particular limit might be. And distinctive constitutional limits on the
suability of states are, for all the reasons noted above, difficult limits to

justify.
We live in an era in which Congress not infrequently passes legislation that gives the federal government an unnecessary role in matters better left to the states. To a considerable extent, the problem
has passed well beyond the range of judicial correction, for most of
the important and debatable exercises of federal power in recent
years fall comfortably within the range of constitutional authority.
Even the statute invalidated in Lopez-one widely and correctly viewed
as a dubious exercise of federal power-was rather easily rehabilitated
218
to fit within constitutional bounds with little loss in its reach.
The majority in Alden and F/orida Prepaidmay have thought that
by protecting a small enclave of state autonomy, it was helping to right
a ship of state that was listing in the direction of excessive national
intervention. But for the reasons noted above, the solution provided
seems constitutionally doubtful and functionally harmful. Without
touching the dubious exercises of national power just noted, the
Court invalidated legislation that the national government reasonably
214 United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d
195 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999), order directing supplemental
briefing, 120 S.Ct. 523 (1999).

215 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).

216 Cf Jackson, supra note 1, at 2226-28. See generallyAdler & Kreimer, supra note
1, at 134-40; Monaghan, supranote 16, at 121-22 (stating that decisions like Seminole
Tribe "work as a catalyst for political and social change").
217 See Kramer, supra note 56.
218 See supra note 159.
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and perhaps correctly viewed as necessary for effective national regulation with regard to matters (fair labor standards and patent regulation) historically and properly undertaken by the federal government.
I have previously suggested that the Court's attempt to cling to conceptions of state sovereign immunity is not stable, and that history
casts serious doubt on the capacity of the Court to stand against the
2 19
current of the national political process in any sustained way.

(Such a prediction-much like a prediction that the stock market will
soar or crash-is more likely eventually to be proven correct if repeated with sufficient frequency.)
What will retard improvident exercises of federal power, if anything will, is not constitutional intervention but political responsibility. I have no great hope that such responsibility will be forthcoming:
nearly everyone claims to believe in federalism, but for most the belief
is an anemic one, easily overcome when it might stand in the way of
particular political or programmatic objectives. 22 0 Still, misdirected
judicial intervention can make a bad situation worse. In a perhaps
apocryphal story, a member of the British Parliament is once said to
have remarked, "Reform? Don't speak to me of reform. Things are
bad enough as they are." There may be wisdom in that remark not
only for legislators but also for judges.

219 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 64.
220 For a stronger statement, see JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNT MATmaS 8
(1998) (noting that by the early 1990s, "[t]he notion that some matters are properly
reserved for the state and localities to determine for themselves... seemed almost to
have disappeared from political culture as well as constitutional law").
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